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TURNING A BLIND EYE: WALL STREET
FINANCE OF PREDATORY LENDING*
Kathleen C. Engel** & Patricia A. McCoy***
INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have discussed the negative externalities that
securitization imposes on creditors.' Scholars have paid scant attention,
however, to harms caused by securitization to debtors whose loans are
securitized. 2 This issue has erupted in the subprime home mortgage
* © Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy 2007. Recipient of the Best Professional
Paper Award of the American College of Consumer Financial Services Lawyers, March
2007. Our thanks to Lissa Broome, Howell Jackson, Melissa Jacoby, Peter Lindseth, Jeremy
Paul, Jim Rebitzer, Elizabeth Renuart, Steve Ross, Peter Siegelman, Michael Stegman,
Susan Wachter, and Art Wilmarth. We also thank Kevin Byers, John Day, Dhammika
Dharmapala, Kurt Eggert, Keith Ernst, Sean Griffith, Claire Hill, Kathleen Keest, Kris
Rengert, Ellen Schloemer, Lalitha Shivaswamy, Alan White, and Elvin Wyly. We are
grateful for the invaluable comments by faculty and other participants at seminars and
colloquia at Harvard Law School, The Wharton School, the University of North Carolina
School of Law, American University School of Law, and our own universities. Our
gratitude to Jessica Matthewson and Margaret Montano for their superb support. Finally,
thanks to the University of Connecticut Law School Foundation and the Cleveland-Marshall
Fund for their generous funding.
** Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. J.D., University of Texas.
*** George J. and Helen M. England Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of
Law. J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Professor McCoy has served
as an expert witness for plaintiffs in several predatory lending cases.
1. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1998); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk
Allocation, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1997); Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 301 (2002); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale
L.J. 1 (1996); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective,
76 Tex. L. Rev. 595 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy,
50 Duke L.J. 1541, 1580-81, 1585-86 (2001).
2. Kurt Eggert was among the first to discuss this issue, in the context of the holder-in-
due-course rule. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization,
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503 (2002). Jonathan Remy
Nash also highlighted this issue in his work on securitization and environmental superliens.
Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed
Securitization, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 127 (2002). Other works have examined
securitization's effect on third-world countries. See Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance,
Securitization and Consensuality, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 411, 434-35 (2002); Anupam
Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 Emory L.J. 923 (2004); Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border
Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 255, 260, 265
(1998); David W. Leebron, First Things First: A Comment on Securitizing Third World
Debt, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 173.
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market, where charges of predatory lending, many of which have been
substantiated, are mounting. 3
The vast majority of subprime loans are now securitized, leading to
claims that securitization facilitates predatory lending and should actively
police lenders. Nonetheless, the entities involved in securitization have
resisted addressing such concerns and continue to serve as major conduits
for predatory loans.4 As this excerpt from one prospectus illustrates,
securitization turns a blind eye to the underwriting of subprime loans:
With the exception of approximately 20.82% of the mortgage loans in
the statistical mortgage pool that were underwritten in accordance with
the underwriting criteria of The Winter Group, underwriting criteria are
generally not available with respect to the mortgage loans. In many
instances the mortgage loans in the statistical mortgage pool were
acquired by Terwin Advisors LLC from sources, including mortgage
brokers and other non-originators, that could not provide detailed
information regarding the underwriting guidelines of the originators. 5
As this suggests, Wall Street firms securitize subprime home loans without
determining if loan pools contain predatory loans. In the worst situations,
secondary market actors have actively facilitated abusive lending. 6
At first blush, securitization's lack of concern about subprime
underwriting seems odd. After all, investors in mortgage-backed securities
should be concerned about the heightened default risk of subprime loans
and predatory loans in particular. 7 Furthermore, they should be concerned
3. See infra note 121. The subprime market charges higher interest rates and fees and
is designed for borrowers with weaker credit.
4. For instance, a 2005 study of securitized subprime loans found that 57.2 percent of
those loans had one or more predatory features, i.e., a balloon clause or a prepayment
penalty with a term of at least three years. See Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman &
Walter R. Davis, The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The
Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments 22-23, 32 tbl.6 (Jan. 25, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The role of securitization
can also be seen in predatory lending lawsuits involving loan assignees or trustees of
securitized trusts that hold home loans. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mundaca Fin. Servs., Inc., 76
S.W.3d 819 (Ark. 2002) (assignee); Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2005)
(trustee); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 616 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (trust and
trustee); Bankers Trust Co. v. West, No. 20984, 2002 WL 31114844 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
25, 2002) (assignee).
5. Merrill Lynch & Co., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated June 18, 2004
(Form 424B5), at S-16 (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/809940/000095013604002052/0000950136-04-002052.txt. Our thanks to Alan White
for drawing this language to our attention.
6. In the most notorious example to date, in 2003, a federal jury held Lehman Brothers
liable, as an investment bank and provider of a warehouse line of credit to the subprime
lender First Alliance Mortgage Corp. (FAMCO), for aiding and abetting FAMCO's fraud on
borrowers. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
7. Subprime home loans are more likely than prime loans to go into default. See, e.g.,
FitchRatings, U.S. Subprime RMBS in CDOs 5-9 (Apr. 15, 2005); Michelle A. Danis &
Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of Subprime Mortgages 5-6 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2005-022A, 2005). Predatory loans present an even
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that subprime lenders will try to pass off their worst loans through
securitization-the "lemons" problem that George Akerlof described.8
Given investors' concerns, one might expect the capital markets to screen
out the riskiest, predatory loans from securitized subprime loan pools.
There is growing evidence, however, that securitizing entities perform
inadequate screening. When meaningful screening does occur, it focuses on
loans originated in states that impose liability on assignees of predatory
loans. In states with weak anti-predatory lending laws, screening is
minimal or nonexistent.
As we explain, securitization solves the lemons problem for investors
without requiring the capital markets to screen out predatory loans from
securitized offerings. Investment banks employ a variety of techniques,
primarily structured finance and deal provisions, to shield investors from
virtually all of the credit and litigation risk associated with predatory loans.
Market and legal forces provide additional protection to investors. For
example, the holder-in-due-course rule shields investors and securitized
trusts from most litigation contesting predatory loan terms. Evidence also
suggests that investors extract price concessions as recompense for the
lemons problem, which pushes up the cost to borrowers of subprime loans.
As a result, investors can safely invest in top-rated subprime mortgage-
backed securities without worrying about losses, even when the underlying
loan pools are replete with questionable loans.9
The protections that securitization provides investors do not safeguard
borrowers. To the contrary, securitization inflicts negative externalities on
subprime borrowers in at least four ways. First, securitization funds small,
thinly capitalized lenders and brokers, thus enabling them to enter the
subprime market. These originators are more prone to commit loan abuses
because they are less heavily regulated, have reduced reputational risk, and
operate with low capital, helping to make them judgment-proof. Second,
securitization dilutes incentives by lenders and brokers to avoid making
loans with excessive default risk by allowing them to shift that risk to the
secondary market, which has other ways to protect itself. Third,
securitization denies injured borrowers legal recourse against assignees by
triggering the holder-in-due-course rule and impeding work-outs. Lastly,
securitization drives up the price of subprime loans because investors
demand a lemons premium for investing in subprime mortgage-backed
securities.
higher risk of default than subprime loans generally. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra
note 4, at 25, 35 tbl.10.
8. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970).
9. See Stephen Wallenstein, Situating Project Finance and Securitization in Context: A
Comment on Bjerre, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 449, 451 (2002) ("[N]egative effects on
select populations are not a concern of... securitization (by which I mean the financing
aspects).").
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The resulting cost to borrowers is substantial. One recent study
estimated that lengthy prepayment penalties in securitized subprime loans
boosted borrowers' risk of foreclosure by sixteen to twenty percent.' 0
Balloon clauses in those loans raised borrowers' risk of foreclosure by an
additional fifty percent." Securitization also exacts significant tolls on
municipalities by fueling predatory lending. When borrowers, saddled with
onerous loan payments, lose or cannot maintain their homes, cities must
contend with abandoned and deteriorating properties, which strain city
resources and threaten the vitality and stability of neighborhoods. 12
Given securitization's role in enabling and perpetuating predatory
lending, we contend that the law should impose full, quantifiable assignee
liability on securitized trusts that do not adopt adequate controls to filter out
predatory loans from loan pools. Today, new automated due diligence
software makes it technologically and economically efficient to screen out
loans with predatory features.
In an earlier article, we proposed federal legislation to require subprime
lenders and brokers to make suitable loans. 13 In this Article, we argue that
assignee liability should apply to suitability violations and certain other
legal violations by mortgage brokers and lenders. Imposing properly
tailored liability on securitizers would force them to take into account the
negative externalities of securitization on borrowers and communities. 14
Our analysis of the securitization of subprime residential mortgages
expands the debate about negative externalities from securitization by
demonstrating that such externalities are not necessarily limited to
originators' unsecured creditors. To the contrary, securitization can impose
negative externalities on debtors who are liable on the underlying
receivables, as well as on surrounding communities.
Moreover, our research helps explain why securitization has taken root.
Claire Hill has argued, for instance, that securitization exists because
valuing a lender's receivables is simpler than valuing the lender itself.
Professor Hill offers the further insight that thinly capitalized lenders-
which she dubs "lemons firms"-have the most to gain from securitizing
10. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 4, at 25.
11. Id.
12. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 355 (2006) (describing externalities that predatory
lending imposes on cities); see also William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, Collateral Damage:
The Municipal Impact of Today's Mortgage Foreclosure Boom 4 (May 11, 2005), available
at http://www.hpfonline.org/PDF/Apgar-Duda-study-final.pdf (estimating that vacant
properties from foreclosures cost cities more than $30,000 per unit in some cases); Family
Housing Fund, Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention 16-17 (1998)
(estimating that Minneapolis and St. Paul lost $2000 on average in tax revenues on vacant
homes and spent up to $40,000 per home rehabilitated and $10,000 per home demolished).
13. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255 (2002).
14. See Janger, supra note 1, at 302, 315.
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their receivables.1 5 We extend her analysis by arguing that securitization
solves two "lemons" problems, not one: the originator's possible
bankruptcy and adverse selection in the loans being sold and ultimately
securitized.
Finally, our research implicitly questions the binary nature of the larger
debate about negative externalities from securitization. Too often, the
debate is framed as whether securitization must be defended from all attack
or altered at its core.16 The parable of the subprime market, however,
suggests that there may be a middle, low-cost course that can protect
borrowers from loan abuses without impeding securitization.
The Article unfolds as follows: In Part I, we provide a brief definition of
predatory lending. Part II describes the growth of subprime securitization,
while Part III provides a thumbnail sketch of securitization of subprime
home mortgage loans. In Part IV, we discuss the risks posed by subprime
securitization and the resulting lemons problem that investors face. Part V
analyzes how securitization solves the lemons problem through a variety of
techniques, including sequential tranches, pricing, limited due diligence,
and contract provisions. In Part VI, we explain why predatory lending
persists despite the substantial risk management techniques employed by
securitization. Part VII presents normative justifications for imposing
assignee liability on residential mortgage-backed securitizations, while Part
VIII sets forth the details of our assignee liability proposal. Finally, in Part
IX, we respond to critics of assignee liability for predatory loans.
I. PREDATORY LENDING DEFINED
Predatory lending is a syndrome of loan abuses that benefit mortgage
brokers, lenders, and securitizers to the serious detriment of borrowers. 17
Such abuses include the following:
(1) Loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers: A major example is asset-based lending, which consists of
loans to borrowers whom the lender knows cannot afford the monthly
payments. Pushing borrowers to take on more debt than they need, steering
prime-eligible borrowers to subprime loans, and refinancing low-interest
loans into costlier loans with no justification can also inflict seriously
disproportionate net harm on borrowers. 18
15. Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 Wash. U. L.Q.
1061, 1091-92 (1996); accord Edward M. lacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization
and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. Legal Stud. 161, 180-82 (2005).
16. Compare sources cited in supra notes 1, 2, and 10, representing different viewpoints
in this debate.
17. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1259-70.
18. Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and
Fairer for America's Families, ch. 5 & nn.5-6 (1996), http://www.freddiemac.com/
corporate/reports/moseley/chap5.htm; see also Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, MBA Best
Practices III (2007), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/IndustryResources/
StandardsandBestPractices/MBABestPractices.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); Patricia
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(2) Rent seeking: Numerous subprime loans charge fees and interest
rates that are exorbitant compared to the risk that the borrowers present.
Rent seeking also encompasses steering and charging prepayment penalties
and points without a corresponding cut in the interest rate, as is customary
in the prime market. 19
(3) Loans involving illegal fraud or deception: Many predatory loans
involve fraud or deception by brokers or lenders. For example, brokers or
lenders may procure inflated appraisals or make false promises to refinance
loans down the road on better terms. 20
(4) Other forms of non-transparency that do not amount to fraud: These
occur when lenders or brokers withhold information from borrowers in
circumstances that fall short of fraud. For example, subprime lenders keep
rate sheets containing their prices secret because they do not want
borrowers to shop for better rates. 21 Neither the Truth in Lending Act 22 nor
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 23 requires disclosure of rate
sheets to borrowers. 24 This secrecy impedes comparison shopping.
(5) Loans requiring borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress:
Subprime loans often contain mandatory arbitration clauses that require
borrowers to take disputes to arbitration and preclude them from joining
class actions. Such provisions deny borrowers access to the courts. 25
(6) Lending discrimination: Many predatory loans impose more
onerous terms on members of protected groups, resulting in discrimination
even after controlling for risk.26
(7) Servicing abuses: Once loans are securitized, a servicer typically
becomes responsible for collecting the loan payments and distributing the
Sturdevant & William J. Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of Predatory Lending Practices,
Consumer Advoc., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 36, 37, 39.
19. Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15
Hous. Pol'y Debate 533, 535 (2004); Sturdevant & Brennan, supra note 18, at 38-39; Alan
M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing: Present and Future Research, 15 Housing Pol'y
Debate 503 (2004); Mark Shroder, The Value of the Sunshine Cure: Efficacy of the RESPA
Disclosure Strategy 11 fig.2, 14-15, 14 tbl.4 (Apr. 4, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
20. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. & -Dep't of the Treasury Task Force on Predatory
Lending, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending 24, 79-80 (2000) [hereinafter
Treasury-HUD Report], available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/
curbing.html.
21. White, supra note 19, at 509-12; see also Peter J. Hong & Marcos Reza, Hidden
Costs to Homeowners: The Prevalent Non-Disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in
Mortgage Loan Transactions, 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 131, 132-34 (2005) (describing
rate sheets).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000).
23. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617.
24. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1305-07.
25. Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1193
(2001).
26. See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: The
Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages (2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrO I1-UnfairLending-0506.pdf.
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proceeds. Some servicers have employed abusive servicing practices,
including charging unjustified fees, actively pushing borrowers into default,
and employing exploitative collection methods.27
1I. THE ADVENT OF SUBPRIME SECURITIZATION
Subprime securitization, a relatively new phenomenon, followed on the
heels of securitization in the prime residential loan market, first pioneered
in the late 1970s.28 By the early 1990s, technological advances made it
possible to estimate and price the risk of subprime home loan pools, paving
the way for subprime securitizations. 29 In 2005, total securitizations of
subprime and home equity loans ballooned to an estimated $525.7 billion.30
Today, lenders securitize almost eighty percent of subprime mortgages. 31
III. How SECURITIZATION WORKS
Securitization is the financial technology that integrates the market for
residential mortgages with the capital markets. In securitization, investment
banks take pools of home loans, carve up the cash flows from those
receivables, and convert the cash flows into bonds that are secured by the
mortgages. The bonds are variously known as residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) or asset-backed securities (ABS).
Securitization goes by the moniker "structured finance," in part because a
securitizer structures the transaction to isolate the loan pool from the
original lender. This is accomplished by selling the loan pool to a special
purpose vehicle or "SPV" that is owned by, but legally distinct from, the
lender. The SPV then resells the loan pool to a second SPV, which is also
independent of the lender and takes title to the bundle. The second SPV is
typically in the form of a trust.32
27. Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 Housing
Pol'y Debate 753, 756-61 (2004).
28. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Bruce A. Markell & Lissa Lamkin Broome,
Securitization, Structured Finance and Capital Markets 1-3 (2004); Michael H. Schill,
Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the
Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1267-71 (1991).
29. See, e.g., Eric Bruskin, Anthony B. Sanders & David Sykes, The Nonagency
Mortgage Market: Background and Overview, in The Handbook of Nonagency Mortgage-
Backed Securities 5, 12-16 (Frank J. Fabozzi, Chuck Ramsey & Michael Marz eds., 2d ed.
2000); Bill Shepherd, Perils and Phantasm: The Mortgage Securitization Boom Is
Threatened by Recession, Legislation and Rate Change, Investment Dealers Dig., Feb. 3,
2003.
30. See Standard & Poor's (S&P), Rating Transitions 2005: U.S. RMBS Volume and
Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, tbl. 1 (Jan. 24, 2006).
31. See S&P, The Subprime Market 7 (June 17, 2005).
32. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1539,
1552-53 (2004). This Article focuses on the "nonconforming" or "private label" market.
The conforming market refers to home loans that conform to underwriting guidelines of
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The GSEs
purchase and package conforming individual mortgages, create the securities, and market the
securities through brokers. See Freddie Mac, The Secondary Market for Mortgage Loans,
2007] 2045
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This two-tiered structure protects investors by preventing lenders'
creditors from reaching the assets backing the securities in case the lender
goes bankrupt.33 Bankruptcy remoteness also boosts ratings of securitized
offerings. Rating agencies evaluate and rate securitized loan pools. To the
extent that SPVs protect investors from the risk of the lender's bankruptcy,
it is often possible for the loan bundle to earn a higher rating than the lender
itself would receive. In this way, "non-investment grade and unrated
originators (the majority of the market) [can] create investment-grade
transactions." 34
After the loans are transferred to the second SPV, the investment bank
for the issuer 35 carves the principal and interest payments into tranches of
bonds.36 Then, rating agencies gauge the credit risk of each tranche by
comparing the loan pool's characteristics with historical data and
forecasting the tranche's performance. 37  In calculating credit risk,
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/what we-do/secmkt.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2007). The nonconforming market, in contrast, finances loans that do not meet the GSE
guidelines.
33. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus.
& Fin. 133, 142 (1994). In many securitizations, a subsidiary of the lender retains some of
the risk, either in the form of subordinate tranches, subordinated excess spread, or cash
reserves. If a lender were to retain those residual interests within its own corporate entity
and later went into bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court might rule that the lender, not the
investors, owned the securitized pool, relegating the investors to the role of secured
creditors. See Len Blum & Chris DiAngelo, Structuring Efficient Asset-Backed
Transactions, in Asset-Backed Securities 237, 243-44 (Anand K. Bhattacharya & Frank J.
Fabozzi eds., 1996). Only on rare occasions have courts disregarded bankruptcy-remote
status. See Michael J. Cohn, Note, Asset Securitization: How Remote Is Bankruptcy
Remote?, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 929 (1998); see also Schwarcz, Markell & Broome, supra note
28, at 80-86; Kenneth M. Ayotte & Stay Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits
of "Bankruptcy Remoteness" (Apr. 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (finding that bankruptcy remoteness protects investors and is priced
into the securities).
34. Henry C. McCall III & Len Blum, Evolution of the B&C Home-Equity Loan
Securities Market, in Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 137, 140.
35. The issuer is the special purpose vehicle (SPV) that issues the securities.
36. Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) use a senior-subordinate tranche
structure and are the most common type of nonconforming mortgage-backed security (MBS)
today. See Bruskin, Sanders & Sykes, supra note 29, at 14. CMOs are derivatives which
consist of interest payments plus principal, interest-only (10) strips, or principal-only (PO)
strips. Other, less common types of MBS include mortgage pass-through securities, in
which investors buy fractional interests in pools of whole single-family mortgages, and
mortgage-backed bonds (MBBs), which are priced according to the liquidation value of the
loans and thus require higher collateral than CMOs. See Andrew Davidson et al.,
Securitization: Structuring and Investment Analysis 185-87, 196, 206-08 (2003); John R.
Brick, A Primer on Mortgage-Backed Securities, in Current Readings on Money, Banking,
and Financial Markets 25, 26, 29-32 (James S. Wilcox & Frederic S. Mishkin eds., 1987).
37. See Neil D. Baron, The Role of Rating Agencies in the Securitization Process, in A
Primer on Securitization 81 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996); see also
Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 24-25; McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 142. Typically
the loan review scrutinizes the lender's underwriting standards, borrower profiles, the
geographical distribution of the loans, loan size, loan-to-value ratios, and the prepayment
characteristics of the bundle. The rating agency will perform a static pool analysis on the
lender's historical loss and delinquency record, using data on the average loss, slope, and
2046 [Vol. 75
TURNING A BLIND EYE
however, rating agencies do not assess the suitability of the underlying
loans for individual borrowers.
The tranche system is termed a "senior-subordinate structure" and is the
"predominant structure of choice in subprime RMBS."'38 The tranches are
arrayed from the most senior to the most junior, with "as many as five
mezzanine or subordinated tranches going down the ratings ladder" from
AAA to B. 39 The senior class is the AAA tranche, the mezzanine class
consists of the AA and A tranches, and the BBB, BB, B, and unrated
classes take the junior position.40 Any rating of BBB-/Baa3 or above is
deemed investment-grade and serves to assuage investors' concerns about
the credit quality of the mortgages backing the securities.
In a feature known as a "waterfall," the senior tranche is paid off before
any other tranche. Once the senior tranche is paid off, the next tranche
moves to the head of the line for principal payments until all of the tranches
are retired.4 1 As a result, the junior tranche is the first to absorb any losses
and shields the senior tranches from losses due to loan defaults.42 Only in
the extremely unlikely event that losses exceeded the amounts due the
holders of the junior tranches would the senior tranches absorb credit
losses.
Before rating agencies issue investment-grade ratings, they insist on
added financial cushions known as "credit enhancements." 43 According to
rating agencies, when determining the needed level of credit enhancements,
they assume catastrophic losses on an order of magnitude of the Great
Depression, with the amount of enhancements depending on the rating
desired, the type of collateral, and the reliability of the historical pool
data. 44
peak loss period of the loan pool to forecast future losses and delinquencies. In addition, the
rating agency will assess the average coupon rate, seasoning, and average maturity of the
loans and sample the loan files to test those statistics. See Baron, supra, at 84-85; Anand K.
Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi, The Expanding Frontiers of Asset Securitization, in Asset-
Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 1, 14; Suzanne Michaud, A Rating Agency Perspective
on Asset-Backed Securitization, in Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 269, 271-73.
38. S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products: Fourth-Quarter 2003 LTV
Ratios, FICO Scores, and Credit Support Levels (2004). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz,
Structured Finance: A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization § 2.4 (3d ed. 2003).
39. Shepherd, supra note 29; see Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 20; Schwarcz,
Markell & Broome, supra note 28, at 4-5; Hill, supra note 15, at 1070 n.39 (describing the
rating systems used by major rating agencies).
40. See Lakhbir Hayre, A Concise Guide to Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs), in
Salomon Smith Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities 9, 54-60
(Lakhbir Hayre ed., 2001).
41. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 208-09, 333; Blum & DiAngelo, supra note
33, at 257-58.
42. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 333; S&P, Rating Transitions 2003: Another
Record Year of Credit Performance for U.S. RMBS (2004).
43. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 24-26; Schwarcz, Markell & Broome, supra
note 28, at 14; Blum & DiAngelo, supra note 33, at 252-53; Leon T. Kendall, Securitization:
A New Era in American Finance, in A Primer on Securitization, supra note 37, at 4; McCall
& Blum, supra note 34, at 140-41.
44. See Baron, supra note 37, at 85; Michaud, supra note 37, at 272.
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Credit enhancements come in two types, internal and external
enhancements. 45 Normally, the lender will provide sufficient internal
enhancements to boost the offering to an investment-grade rating. If the
internal enhancements do not raise the senior tranche to a top AAA rating,
monoline insurers or other outside providers may add external
enhancements to raise the senior tranche to an AAA. 4 6
Once investment-grade ratings are in hand, the investment bank will
price the mortgage-backed securities and sell them to investors, either
through a public offering or a private placement.47 If the offering succeeds
as planned, the lender receives two forms of revenue. The first is cash from
the sale of the securities. The second is "excess spread," which is the right
to any interest on the loans that exceeds the interest paid to the investors
after deducting expenses on the asset-backed bonds. In most situations, the
present value of the cash proceeds plus the excess spread exceeds the cash
that the lender would have received from selling whole loans. 48
IV. THE LEMONS PROBLEM
In order to succeed, securitization must solve a core problem-that is,
why should investors buy mortgage-backed securities when lenders can
deceive them about the quality of the loans in the loan pool? Lenders have
incentives to cherry-pick their loans and sell the worst ones to investors. 49
And knowing that they can unload the worst loans onto investors, lenders
have less reason to underwrite loans carefully. Thus, securitization gives
45. Internal credit enhancements earmark part of the cash flow from the mortgages to
fund a cash buffer to protect the senior and mezzanine tranches from losses. The most
common internal enhancements are the senior-subordinate structure, excess spread accounts,
and over-collateralization. See Baron, supra note 37, at 85-87; Brick, supra note 36, at 29-
32; Bruskin, Sanders & Sykes, supra note 29, at 31-35; Lina Hsu & Cyrus Mohebbi, Credit
Enhancement in ABS Structures, in Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 33, at 277, 281-83.
Most external credit enhancements consist of guarantees by monoline insurance companies.
See Baron, supra note 37, at 86-87; Hsu & Mohebbi, supra, at 278-80.
46. See Schwarcz, supra note 38, §§ 2:3, 2:4; Hsu & Mohebbi, supra note 45, at 278.
47. See Davidson et al., supra note 36, at 20; Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third
World Debt, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 137, 141.
48. See McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 141-43.
49. As the president of one of the largest mortgage lenders put it in announcing that the
company planned to securitize all of its subprime loans, "'We're looking to hold only
pristine product on the balance sheet."' Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, How American
Lenders Shelter Themselves, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 2005, at C1 (quoting Stanford Kurland,
President, Countrywide Financial Corp.). Similarly, Armando Falcon, Jr., the former
director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, testified before Congress that
Fannie Mae cherry-picked the loans it securitized and kept the best in portfolio, consistent
with its policy to "keep the best; sell the rest." OFHEO Agreement with Fannie Mae:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov 't Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Fin. Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Armando Falcon, Jr., Director, Office
of Fed. Hous. Enterprise Oversight).
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rise to the problem of adverse selection or the "lemons" problem, in the
words of George Akerlof.50
Before the advent of securitization, lenders typically handled loans from
cradle to grave. They solicited loan applicants, underwrote and financed
the mortgages, serviced the loans, and held the loans in portfolio to
maturity. In turn, lenders largely made profits from the interest payments
on the loans. Because lenders bore the full risk of default, they had strong
incentives to turn down observationally risky borrowers. 51
Securitization alters this incentive structure by unbundling the tasks in
lending and barceling them out among a string of market actors. A
mortgage broker may recruit loan applicants, a lender may originate the
loans, a specialist firm may provide the servicing, a trust may hold the
loans, and outside investors may provide the financing.
The lemons problem occurs because unbundling creates information
asymmetries that mortgage lenders (or brokers) can exploit to investors'
detriment. 52 A loan's credit risk turns on numerous characteristics, some of
which are observable and others of which are not. Neither the lender nor
investors are privy to characteristics that are unobservable. However, the
lender has observable data on borrowers' default propensities that investors
lack. 53 Investors do not interview the loan applicants, do not obtain or
review property appraisals, and almost never examine individual loan
applications, borrowers' credit reports, or income verifications. Instead,
they rely on the issuer's warranties and representations about the borrowers'
credit quality. Needless to say, in the subprime sector, these information
asymmetries can be pronounced because subprime borrowers are prone to
have credit flaws that lenders will want to conceal.
In sum, securitization enables lenders "to shift the risk [of the loan's
performance] onto the investor."'54 The more that securitization allows
lenders to "take the profits and run," the more adverse selection will rear its
50. See Akerlof, supra note 8; Amy C. Cutts et al., Lemons with a Twist: Adverse
Selection and the Role of Securitization in Mortgage Market Evolution and Pricing (June
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
51. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1981).
52. When lenders use mortgage brokers, the brokers have even fuller information than
the lenders about observable characteristics of the borrower. Lenders who securitize loans
may be indifferent to deceit by brokers about default risks if they can shift the risk of loss
wholesale to the secondary market. See Patrick Barta, Is Appraisal Process Skewing Home
Values?, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 2001, at Al.
53. See Cutts et al., supra note 50; Wayne Passmore & Roger W. Sparks, Automated
Underwriting and the Profitability of Mortgage Securitization, 28 Real Est. Econ. 285, 285
(2000) (describing how lenders try to conceal borrowers' bad credit histories from
investors).
54. Lalitha A. Shivaswamy, Structured Transactions and Private Placement Criteria and
Challenges to Investment in the 144A Market 5 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Fordham Law Review). As one set of researchers recently observed, "[Tlhe market for
multi-class MBS is a market for lemon mortgage pools." Chris Downing, Dwight Jaffee &
Nancy Wallace, Information Asymmetries in the Mortgage Backed Securities Market 20
(May 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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head.55 Solving adverse selection is the key to successful securitization of
home loans. In the home mortgage context, securitization must solve the
lemons problem for three types of risk-credit risk, prepayment risk, and
litigation risk-which we now discuss.
A. Credit Risk
Credit risk is the risk that a borrower will miss payments and the loan
will go into default. All loans involve credit risk, but subprime loans
involve more risk than prime loans because borrowers with impaired credit
are more likely to default. 56 Furthermore, when a predatory lender makes a
loan to a borrower whom it knows cannot afford the monthly loan
payments, default will likely become a self-fulfilling prophecy.57
Investment banks and rating agencies measure the credit risk in loan
pools by extrapolating from historical data on loan pools with similar
characteristics. In the subprime market, several factors make these
historical inferences more difficult. First, there is less historical data on
subprime loan pools than prime pools, because subprime securitizations did
not take off until the early 1990s. Second, subprime loan pools present
much larger variance in credit risk. Prime loan pools are limited to the most
creditworthy "A" grade borrowers and cover a narrow band of the credit
risk spectrum. Moreover, the risk associated with that narrow band has
been empirically tested and confirmed over time. Newer subprime loan
pools, in contrast, can cover the entire risk spectrum, from A and A-
borrowers down to the weakest D borrowers.58 Third, foreclosure costs
vary by state, complicating the job of estimating default costs. 59 Finally,
many subprime securitizations are sold on a to-be-announced (TBA) basis,
where the lender does not actually form the loan pool until the mortgage-
backed securities have been sold, making historical comparisons impossible
55. See Cutts et al., supra note 50; Passmore & Sparks, supra note 53, at 285. George
Akerlof commented on a similar problem affecting middlemen in India who tried to
arbitrage between the cheap loan rates of central city banks and the exorbitant loan rates of
local moneylenders who had personal knowledge of the borrowers, observing, "The
middleman who tries to arbitrage between the rates of the moneylender and the central bank
is apt to attract all the 'lemons' and thereby make a loss." Akerlof, supra note 8, at 499.
56. John C. Weicher, The Home Equity Lending Industry: Refinancing Mortgages for
Borrowers with Impaired Credit 76 (1997); Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime and Prime
Mortgages: Loss Distributions 7 (Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, Working Paper No.
03-1, 2003).
57. For discussion of why a lender might make a loan that is virtually certain to go into
default, see Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1280-89.
58. See Weicher, supra note 56, at 56-57 tbl.4.1.
59. See Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State Foreclosure Laws
on Loan Losses: Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. Money, Credit &
Banking 221, 222 (1990); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection
Laws, 77 Va. L. Rev. 489 (1991).
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before the offering has been closed.60 These blind spots in evaluating
subprime credit risk can hamper efforts to accurately set prices and gauge
returns.
B. Prepayment Risk
Prepayment risk is the risk that borrowers will pay off their principal
before maturity. Prepayment disrupts investors' cash flows in two ways.
First, it accelerates the return of principal. Second, it cancels future cash
flows from interest payments. If borrowers prepay when interest rates are
below coupon (i.e., the nominal interest rate on the loan), investors who
want equivalent risk are forced to reinvest the principal at a lower rate of
return.
Borrowers in the prime and subprime markets prepay for different
reasons. In the prime market, prepayment most often occurs when
homeowners refinance their mortgages to take advantage of falling interest
rates. 61 In the subprime market, borrowers often have more difficulty
qualifying for new loans, making them less sensitive to drops in interest
rates. 62 Instead, subprime prepayments tend to occur for two reasons, one
voluntary in nature and one involuntary. Voluntary prepayments take place
when subprime borrowers improve their credit scores and refinance into
prime products at lower rates. Involuntary prepayments, in contrast, are
triggered by "loan flipping," in which lenders persuade subprime borrowers
to refinance their loans repeatedly at short intervals in order to extract high
fees. 63 Lenders can manufacture future loan flips by structuring the original
loans so that borrowers will eventually be unable to repay.64
60. See Jacob Boudoukh et al., Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Multifactor
Interest Rate Environment: A Multivariate Density Estimation Approach, 10 Rev. Fin. Stud.
405, 410, 419 (1997).
61. See id. at 406, 437; Amy Crews Cutts & Robert Van Order, On the Economics of
Subprime Lending 3, 7 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-01, 2004).
62. Subprime prepayments do rise as interest rates fall. See, e.g., Quercia, Stegman &
Davis, supra note 4, at 21. But subprime "borrowers' limited refinancing opportunities"
mean that "refinancing rates must fall 200 to 300 basis points (bps) to significantly increase
prepayments due to refinancing in the [subprime] market versus the 25 to 50 bps that move
the private [prime] MBS market." R. Russell Hurst, Securities Backed by Closed-End Home
Equity Loans, in The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities 281, 292 (Frank J. Fabozzi,
ed., 5th ed. 2001) (emphasis added).
63. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 515; ABSNet, Glossary,
http://www.absnet.net/help/gloss-new.asp#l (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (defining involuntary
prepayment).
64. For example, a loan might include a hefty prepayment penalty that would be
triggered if the borrower refinanced immediately before or after the interest rate on an
adjustable rate mortgage adjusted. Alternatively, a large balloon clause can exert pressure
on a borrower to agree to a loan flip if the borrower's credit rating has fallen too far to
refinance elsewhere on better terms.
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C. Litigation Risk
Investors face the further risk that borrowers will sue the trusts that hold
the securitized loans for wrongdoing in the origination of those loans.
Successful borrower litigation, especially litigation that results in large
compensatory or punitive damages awards against the trust, can have a
negative and serious impact on investors' returns. Thus, securitization
deals must be structured to avoid litigation risk altogether or to predict and
price it efficiently.
Trusts expose themselves to liability if they aid or participate in unlawful
activities by loan originators, most often by being involved with the actual
loan underwriting. Such participation can give rise to liability for violations
of an array of laws ranging from consumer protection and credit
discrimination statutes to conspiracy and fair housing laws. 65
Some laws impose liability on assignees even absent active wrongdoing.
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) allows borrowers to recover against
assignees for originators' violations if the violations are "apparent on the
face of' federal disclosure statements. 66  The principal federal anti-
predatory lending law, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), 67 imposes strict liability on assignees who purchase specific
high-cost loans. In general, holders of HOEPA loans are "subject to all
claims and defenses.., that the borrower could assert against the originator
of the mortgage." 68  Regulations implementing the Federal Trade
Commission Act impose liability on assignees for "all claims and defenses
which the debtor could assert against the seller. '69 Lastly, several states
have enacted anti-predatory lending laws that impose liability on
assignees. 70 Although these statutes allow for assignee liability, in reality
65. See, e.g., Wise v. Union Acceptance Corp., No. 02-0104, 2002 WL 31730920, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2002) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Cooper v. First Gov't Mortgage
& Investors Corp., No. 00-0536, 2002 WL 31520158, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2002)
(consumer protection law); Hays v. Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., 46 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497 (S.D.
W. Va. 1999) (conspiracy law); Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529,
537-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (Fair Housing Act).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a), (e)(2) (2000). Furthermore, if an originator fails to make the
required disclosures to borrowers, the borrower may exercise the right of rescission against
the assignee even if the TILA violation is not apparent on the face of the loan documents. Id.
§ 1641(c).
67. Id. §§ 1601-1667.
68. Id. § 1641(d)(1).
69. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2005). This so-called FTC Rule only governs home mortgage
loans that involve the sale of goods or services. Id. Some courts have construed the rule to
hold, however, that if state consumer protection laws do not permit affirmative relief,
consumers are limited to defensive actions against assignees. See, e.g., LaBarre v. Credit
Acceptance Corp., 175 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999).
70. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-27(b)-(e) (West Supp. 2006); N.Y. Banking Law
§ 6-1(7), (11)-(13) (McKinney Supp. 2007). See generally Baher Azmy, Squaring the
Predatory Lending Circle, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 295 (2005) (surveying state laws). Increasingly,
federal regulators have preempted state anti-predatory lending laws that impose assignee
liability. See Bank Activities and Operations: Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34) (ruling that OCC
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the application of the laws is quite narrow. In some cases, the laws require
active participation by the assignees. In others, the laws only apply to a
small fraction of loans, as is true for HOEPA. 71
For most potential claims, however, assignees who have distanced
themselves from the unlawful activities of originators can find shelter in the
holder-in-due course doctrine, which insulates them from most claims for
unconscionability, breach of contract, and fraud. 72  To satisfy the
requirements of a holder in due course, the purchaser must be the holder of
a negotiable note, who took the note for value, in good faith, and without
notice that the note contains certain defects.73 To meet the definition of a
"holder," the assignee must possess the note and the note must be "issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank."'74 If a note is
payable to an identified person or entity, the note must bear an endorsement
or be among a group of loans to which an allonge was attached.75 When
assignees qualify as holders in due course, they take the notes free of most
defenses to nonpayment and affirmative claims that borrowers could have
pursued against the originators.
There are scenarios under which borrowers can defeat assignees' status
as holders in due course. When an assignee has notice of a potential claim,
for example, that a note was obtained through fraud, the assignee is deemed
to have sufficient notice to abrogate its status as a holder in due course. 76
Assignees obviously have "notice" if they played a role in the
wrongdoing. 77 Notice similarly exists if the borrower brought the claim
against the assignor prior to the assignment. 78
In other instances, failures by originators to comply with technical
requirements of the holder-in-due-course rule can open the door to assignee
liability. 79 Despite the demanding nature of these requirements, failure to
enforcement preempts state anti-predatory lending laws' application to national banks). On
a parallel front, states have preempted many local lending ordinances that contemplate
assignee liability. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d 266
(Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding New York City's anti-predatory lending ordinance preempted by
state and federal law).
71. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) covers at best only about
five percent of subprime first-lien home mortgage loans. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 66 Fed.
Reg. 65,604, 65,608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
72. James White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 14-1, 14-2
(2000).
73. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005).
74. White & Summers, supra note 72, § 14-3.
75. Id.
76. See id. § 14-7 (discussing cases).
77. See, e.g., Williams v. Cent. Money Co., 974 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1997) (denying
summary judgment for assignees on fraud and unconscionability claims where there was
evidence that the assignee "participated in the fraud perpetrated by" the assignor).
78. See Fairbanks Capital Corp. v. Summerall, No. 02AP-864, 2003 WL 1700487, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2003).
79. For example, a note that requires performance other than a promise to make the
payments due is not negotiable and thus does not give rise to the holder-in-due-course
defense if it is sold. See White & Summers, supra note 72, § 14-4 (discussing cases).
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comply with the technical requirements of the holder-in-due-course rule is
rarely litigated in predatory home loan cases.
Courts have also held that assignees can lose holder-in-due-course
protection if their relationships with loan originators were sufficiently close
to make the assignees agents of the originators.80 Even where no agency
relationship exists between the originator and the assignee, courts have
imputed knowledge of an originator's wrongdoing to an assignee based on
the strength and nature of ties between the assignor and the assignee. 81
To recap, credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation risk have the
potential to make investors gun-shy about investing in securitizations.
Allaying these concerns is a central task of structured finance.
V. How STRUCTURED FINANCE SOLVES THE LEMONS PROBLEM
In order to attract outside investors, securitization must solve the lemons
problem in all of its three guises: credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation
risk. In this section, we describe how securitization reduces these risks
through a variety of techniques. Notably, securitization can insulate
investors from the risks of predatory lending without excluding predatory
loans from securitized loan pools. In the process, securitization solves the
lemons problem for investors without discouraging predatory lending itself.
A. The Protections Provided by Sequential Tranches
One way securitization protects investors from credit risk is through
sequential tranches. According to Fitch Ratings, defaults in the subprime
market "start in month seven, ramp up to a peak in months 28-42, and end
at month 120. ''82 For this reason, risk-averse investors-the ones most
concerned with loan default-want to be paid off as quickly as possible.
Investors who are most risk-averse buy the AAA tranche, investors who are
slightly less risk-averse buy the AA tranche, and so it goes down the line.
The senior tranche is retired first, followed by the AA tranche, etc.,
enabling the investors who are most risk-averse to get paid first.
Originators sometimes-but not always-hold the most junior, and
therefore the riskiest, tranches. 83 This technique has worked so well that
the safest subprime tranches-the senior tranches-virtually never suffer
credit losses.
Likewise, when notes lack the proper endorsements or are not in the possession of the
assignee, they are not negotiable. See id. § 14-3 (discussing cases).
80. See, e.g., England v. MG Invs., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 718, 722-23 (S.D. W. Va. 2000)
(denying summary judgment on a fraud claim where evidence showed that the originator
was acting as an agent of the assignee).
81. See Williams, 974 F. Supp. at 26-27 (imputing knowledge to the assignee where an
officer of the originator, who had "direct contact" with the borrower, was alleged to be a
principal and shareholder of the assignee).
82. FitchRatings, supra note 7, at 8, 9.
83. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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B. Investors in Subprime Offerings Benefit from Conservative Risk
Assessments by Rating Agencies
Individuals and entities who purchase bonds in subprime RMBS
offerings can benefit from rating agencies' tendency to overestimate credit
risk. As securities trade on the secondary market, the rating agencies
reevaluate the performance of the underlying collateral in the securitized
loan pools and upgrade or downgrade the affected tranches as needed. If
the rating model is accurate and there are no unanticipated credit shocks,
tranches should keep their original grades. If the rating agency later
upgrades a tranche in response to information on collateral performance, its
original credit risk assessment was too conservative. If it later downgrades
a tranche due to poor loan performance, its initial assessment was too
sanguine.
Standard & Poor's (S&P) reports for 2003 through 2006 expressly tout
data that S&P tends to overestimate the credit risk of senior subprime
tranches. As the chart on the following page shows, S&P upgrades
outpaced downgrades in public subprime home loan securitizations through
2005, and downgrades in the senior subprime tranches were almost
nonexistent through 2005 and rare in 2006.84
Two aspects of these data are noteworthy. First, until 2006, upgrades
outnumbered downgrades. In 2003, for instance, S&P issued almost 2.5
upgrades for every subprime RMBS downgrade (Ill upgrades to 46
downgrades). In 2004, this ratio widened, and it widened again in 2005. In
2004, S&P issued 4.22 upgrades for every subprime downgrade (152
upgrades to 36 downgrades); in 2005, there were 4.6 subprime upgrades for
every subprime downgrade (235 upgrades to 51 downgrades). This data
reveals that, at least through 2005, when S&P made errors, its errors were
skewed toward excessive caution.
Second, the senior tranches are the main beneficiaries of S&P's
excessively conservative ratings of subprime RMBS. Subprime securities
rated A+ or higher had numerous upgrades (70 in 2003, 90 in 2004, 117 in
84. In fact, in 2006, the vast majority (98.5%) of public and private subprime tranches
combined rated by S&P either kept their ratings or received upgrades. S&P, Transition
Study: U.S. RMBS Upgrades Are Down and Downgrades Are Up in 2006 (2007). The 1.5
percent of tranches that received S&P downgrades were probably a reflection of the fact that
toward the end of 2005, mortgage loan delinquency rates began rising. Al Yoon, Housing
Bubble Bursts in US. Mortgage Bond Market (Update 2), Bloomberg.com, Dec. 6, 2005,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid = 10000103&sid=aDSB37OItSJU&refer=us.
Indeed, S&P's slow response to the inherent risk in subprime securitizations caused
Gretchen Morgenson of The New York Times to lament, "It's amazing how long it can take
investors to see that the wheels are coming off a prized investment vehicle. Denial, after all,
is a powerful thing." Gretchen Morgenson, Will Other Mortgage Dominoes Fall?, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 2007, at C1.
We compiled our data from S&P, supra note 42, app. 2 (2004); S&P, Rating Transitions
2004: U.S. RMBS Stellar Performance Continues to Set Records, app. 2 (2005) [hereinafter
S&P, Rating Transitions 2004]; S&P, Rating Transitions 2005: U.S. RMBS Volume and
Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, apps. 1-2 (2006); S&P, Transition Study: U.S.
RMBS Upgrades Are Down and Downgrades Are Up in 2006, apps. 1-2 (2007).
2007] 2055
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
2005, and 57 in 2006). Conversely, only one of the senior classes rated A+
or higher in 2003 through 2005 suffered a downgrade, despite rising
subprime loan default rates. In 2006, this figure rose to thirteen; upgrades
of those classes still outnumbered downgrades by more than four to one. As
one subprime lender declared, "If you buy the Triple-A, you're home
free."85
Table 1: S&P Upgrades and Downgrades of Public Subprime RMBS,
2003-2006
L rds 0 16 47 2 5 28 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 5 1 7 0 6 0 5 10 3 0
o 21 85 4 7 54 11 16 24 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 1 0 0 3 0 1 II 7 2 10 0 8 0 8 0 0Dokmnfades
This rosy upgrade experience serves two important marketing functions.
First, it allays investors' concerns about lemon loans. Second, it entices
potential investors to purchase senior subprime tranches by holding out the
possibility that investors will enjoy upgrades over time. 86 This upgrade
experience, plus a structure that enables senior bonds to mature quickly,
helps explain the remarkable growth in subprime RMBS. 87
C. Diversification
Diversification is another means by which securitization reduces
investors' risk, including the risk of "lemon" loans. Because there is high
85. H&R Block, Inc. at UBS Global Financial Services Conference-F, FD (Fair
Disclosure) Wire, May 10, 2005.
86. The larger significance of S&P's upgrade/downgrade data for subprime loan pools is
uncertain because S&P does not always report the total number of subprime tranches whose
ratings remained unchanged. Some sense of the magnitude can be gleaned from S&P
reports, however, that 91.45% of all 17,674 RMBS tranches (including prime and subprime)
rated in 2004 maintained the same credit rating a year later, while only 0.82% suffered
downgrades and 7.73% experienced upgrades. See supra note 84.
87. An empirical study of Freddie Mac multi-class RMBS recently reached the same
conclusion, finding that "the capital structures of multi-class MBS" evolved as a solution to
the lemons problem. Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra note 54, at 20.
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investor demand for subprime RMBS, lenders can securitize large pools of
subprime loans. In turn, large loan pools enable investors to better diversify
risk. The greater the diversity in the loan pool in terms of geography, credit
risk, prepayment risk, and legal risk, the less likely it is that investors will
suffer losses. 88
D. Pricing
Because of the lemons problem, investors in RMBS demand a risk
premium, in the form of a price reduction, to compensate them for the risk
of adverse selection. To some extent, investment banks seek to reduce this
risk premium by refining their pricing models to calibrate risks more
accurately. Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that the prices for
RMBS still contain lemons premia.89
In response, lenders who securitize their loans extract price concessions
from subprime borrowers in the form of excessive interest rates,
prepayment penalties, and other loan terms. In 2004 and 2005, for instance,
rating agencies demanded costlier protections for investors in subprime
RMBS, prompting subprime lenders to raise the interest rates on their loans
in response. 90 This evidence is consistent with findings that securitization
can push up home mortgage rates. 91
Studies of securitized subprime loans have found evidence of
overpricing. Freddie Mac researchers have concluded, for example, that
88. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 15, at 1088.
89. See Wayne Passmore & Roger Sparks, Putting the Squeeze on a Market for Lemons:
Government-Sponsored Mortgage Securitization, 13 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 27 (1996);
Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra note 54, at 4, 21 (finding that Freddie Mac faced a
"lemons discount" on the sale of multi-class RMBS).
90. See Erick Bergquist, Block Quits Subprime Price Fight, Am. Banker, Sept. 6, 2005,
at 1 (reporting that H&R Block's subprime lender, Option One, raised its interest rates on its
home loans by forty basis points because the rating agencies were "demanding more costly
protection for investors"); Ed Jones, Getting into Nonprime Lending Is No Problem with
New Technology, Secondary Marketing Executive, Oct. 2004, at 40 ("Major investors can
control both the base and incremental pricing they provide to various [subprime] lenders
around the country."); Allison Pyburn, Home Equity Sub Spreads Finally Show Signs of
Widening, Asset Securitization Rep., July 4, 2005; Howard Schneider, Versatility for Long-
Term Success, Nat'l Mortgage Broker Mag., Feb. 2006, available at
http://www.nationalmortgagebroker.com ("[subprime] investors now are demanding higher
yields to compensate for increased risks. Worries about future delinquencies ha[ve]
investors pushing prices down on mortgage-backed bonds, causing yields to go up on
mortgages made to consumers with low FICO scores."); National City at Goldman Sachs
Financial Services CEO Conference 2005-F, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Dec. 6, 2005
(acknowledging "the pressure on gain on sale coming from the capital markets"); Q1 2006
H&R Block, Inc. Earnings Conference Call-F, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Sept. 1, 2005
(defending the price hike because, given subprime credit risks, "investors[] ought to be paid
more for it").
91. See Andrea Heuson, Wayne Passmore & Rogers Sparks, Credit Scoring and
Mortgage Securitization: Implications for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability, 23 J.
Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 337, 347-53 (2001); Passmore & Sparks, supra note 89; Steven Todd,
The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs, 29 Real Est. Econ. 29 (2001);
Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra note 54, at 4-5, 21.
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subprime lenders steered unwitting customers who qualified for prime loans
into subprime products, forcing those customers to overpay for credit.92
Another Freddie Mac study examined the question whether subprime loans
properly price borrowers' risk by comparing the interest rates of prime and
subprime (specifically A-) loans securitized by Freddie Mac. After holding
credit risk constant, the study concluded that "roughly one-half of the
interest rate premium paid by subprime borrowers-100 basis points-
cannot easily be explained by the higher levels of risk associated with these
types of loans." 93 The study made no "attempt to account for or measure
the higher average origination points and fees paid by subprime
borrowers." 94 In the authors' view, the "total prices charged to subprime
borrowers (rates, points, and fees) are ... likely in excess of the amounts
that can be justified by their differentially higher credit risk."'95
A new body of research reveals that prepayment penalties similarly push
the cost of subprime loans above their risk-adjusted price. Prepayment
penalties are common in subprime loans, while prime loans almost never
92. For example, in 1996, Freddie Mac found that ten to thirty-five percent of subprime
borrowers could have qualified for prime-rate loans. Freddie Mac, supra note 18, ch. 5 &
nn.5-6; Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, The Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory
Lending Reforms 8 (2006) (finding that fourteen percent of subprime borrowers studied
between 1998 and 2004 were prime-eligible); Lax et al., supra note 19, at 565 (finding that
"some borrowers end up with subprime loans for reasons other than risk" and calling that
finding "disturbing"). Fannie Mae's former President Franklin Raines similarly stated that
up to half of all subprime mortgages are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae under its prime
loan guidelines. See HUD's Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed.
Reg. 65,044, 65,053 (Oct. 31, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81); see also Darryl E.
Getter, Consumer Credit Risk and Pricing, 40 J. Consumer Aff. 41, 49-50 (2006) (finding
that 36.4 percent of households paying the costliest interest rates on home mortgage "were of
high credit quality"); Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Profiting from Fine Print with
Wall Street's Help, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1.
93. Lax et al., supra note 19, at 569.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 569; accord Li & Ernst, supra note 92, at 15 (finding that nominal interest
rates on subprime loans in states without strong anti-predatory lending laws were twenty-five
basis points higher on average than on comparable loans in states with strong state laws).
Lax and his colleagues discussed a persistent price discontinuity on the order of 200-plus
basis points separating A and A- loans, only part of which could be explained by risk. See
Lax et al., supra note 19, at 567-68. For discussion of the significance of this price
discontinuity, see White, supra note 19, at 512-13. The finance literature is riddled with the
fallacy that securitization reduces the price borrowers pay for credit by lowering the lender's
cost of funds. See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 43, at 2; Thomas E. Plank, The Security of
Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655, 1668 (2004); Michael
H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 269, 280 (1999); Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 136; Joseph C. Shenker &
Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69
Tex. L. Rev. 1369, 1379-81 (1991). The high transaction costs of securitization are hard to
square with assertions of cost savings. See Iacobucci & Winter, supra note 15, at 168;
Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 139-42. Even if there were cost savings, that assumes that the
savings are passed on to borrowers. Finally, the cost savings theory fails to take account of
the fact that investors demand compensation for the lemons problem.
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carry such penalties. 96  Industry representatives defend prepayment
penalties by arguing that subprime prepayment speeds are faster than
prime.97 However, there is "sparse" empirical data from the industry to
support that claim, and what there is consists only of summary statistics. 98
In contrast, recent multivariate regression analyses have found that
prepayment speeds of high-risk borrowers are the same as or slower than
speeds of low-risk borrowers. 99 Two of those studies found that slower
prepayment speeds made subprime loans relatively more profitable than
96. Prepayment penalties can stay in force for up to five years and commonly consist of
six months of interest on the amount prepaid less twenty percent. See Anand K.
Bhattacharya, Prepayment Penalty Mortgage-Backed Securities, in The Handbook of
Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 62, at 75, 77-78. Studies have determined that
anywhere from fifty-one to ninety-eight percent of subprime mortgages carry prepayment
penalties, depending on the time period studied. In comparison, prepayment penalties are
found in less than two percent of prime mortgages. See Li & Ernst, supra note 92, at 8, 12;
Treasury-HUD Report, supra note 20, at 93; Joshua Brockman, Fannie Revamps
Prepayment-Penalty Bonds, Am. Banker, July 20, 1999, at 16.
97. See, e.g., Weicher, supra note 56, at 69; McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 141-42;
see also Treasury-HUD Report, supra note 20, at 28.
98. Anthony Pennington-Cross, Credit History and the Performance of Prime and
Nonprime Mortgages, 27 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 279 (2003); see also Wayne R. Archer et
al., Household Income, Termination Risk and Mortgage Pricing, 27 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ.
11, 135 n.1 (2003).
99. See Archer et al., supra note 98 (finding no significant difference between
prepayment speeds of low-income and more affluent households; also finding that higher
loan-to-value ratios substantially slowed prepayment speeds for low-income households);
Pennington-Cross, supra note 98, at 280-81, 289-94, 296-97, 300 (concluding that
prepayment speeds dropped as credit scores dropped and that average A- prepayment speeds
were slower than prime prepayment speeds for borrowers with FICO scores under 700);
Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages 23
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. LIHO-01.10, 2001)
(concluding that black and Hispanic borrowers had significantly slower prepayment rates
than whites, even after controlling for FICO scores and loan-to-value ratios); Yongheng
Deng & Stuart Gabriel, Risk-Based Pricing and the Enhancement of Mortgage Credit
Availability Among Underserved and Higher Credit-Risk Populations 11, 13-14, 17-19, 32
tbl. 1 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (finding
that lower FICO scores, high loan-to-value ratios, and being black, Hispanic, or q single
female were predictors of lower prepayment speeds); see also Davidson et al., supra note 36,
at 330-31; Ivan Gjaja, Prepayments on RFC Fixed-Rate Subprime/HELs, in Salomon Smith
Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities, supra note 40, at 519, 537;
Infovest 21 LLC, Strategy Focus: Multi-Strategy Fixed Income (July 1, 2005) (noting that
for mortgage derivatives, "agency derivatives [i.e., issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac]
have more prepayment risk" than private label RMBS); Harris Nesbitt, Asset-Backed Update
6 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/transaction/Nesbitt29AprO5.pdf
(noting that fast prepayments decrease excess spread, "making the transaction much more
sensitive to spikes in losses or deterioration in general performance"); Lakhbir Hayre &
Robert Young, Anatomy of Prepayments: The Salomon Smith Barney Prepayment Model, in
Salomon Smith Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities, supra note
40, at 131, 161-62; Hurst, supra note 62, at 292 (explaining that "prepayment of [subprime
home loans] has proved to be much more stable than that of the [prime] MBS market and has
resulted in securitization with less negative convexity"). Industry data also suggest that the
newest subprime product, interest-only adjustable rate mortgages, "prepay more slowly than
regular amortizing ARMs." Banc of Am. Sec., ABS Research Note: 2005 Outlook:
Cautiously Optimistic 15-16 (2005); see also Neil J. Morse, The Interest-Only Craze,
Mortgage Banking, Oct. 2004, at 52.
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prime loans, even after controlling for differences in credit risk.' 00
Conversely, in some interest-rate environments when credit risk is rapidly
rising, faster subprime prepayment speeds can actually boost subprime
profits. In the summer of 2005, for example, S&P lauded faster subprime
prepayment speeds for "driving superior [subprime] performance."
According to S&P, "[e]xtended deals may lead to greater losses" due to
heightened risk of foreclosure. 101
Subprime lenders also contend that prepayment penalties represent a
trade-off for lower interest rates. If this were true, one would expect
subprime borrowers with prepayment penalties to pay lower interest rates
than comparable subprime borrowers without. This is not the case. A
recent study found that prepayment penalties had little or no downward
effect on interest rates on subprime refinance loans after controlling for
property location, loan terms, and underwriting factors based on borrowers'
characteristics. For subprime home purchase loans, prepayment penalties
went hand-in-hand with higher interest rates after controlling for geography
and credit risk. 102 Originators have incentives to charge higher interest
rates and prepayment penalties because these terms generate higher prices
when the loans are sold or packaged for securitization.
To summarize, the lemons problem causes investors in senior tranches of
subprime RMBS to pressure lenders to impose excess costs on borrowers.
Lenders respond to this pressure by charging borrowers higher interest rates
and fees and adding onerous loan terms, such as prepayment penalties.
E. Due Diligence
Due diligence is another technique that lenders, underwriters, rating
agencies, and institutional purchasers of subprime RMBS use to manage
risk. However, to the extent these entities engage in any due diligence, it is
limited in scope. "[I]n the past, Wall Street... hoped [investors] could
purchase originated assets without having to do much [due] diligence on the
origination side."'1 3 Largely, that was because investors depended on the
100. Deng & Gabriel, supra note 99, at 20; see id. at 5, 22; see also Van Order & Zom,
supra note 99, at 27 (concluding that for low-income and minority borrowers, "the lower
costs from exercising the prepayment option have at least offset these [default costs] for our
loan sample").
101. See S&P, supra note 31, at 35; see also id. at 13, 45, 51; accord Banc of Am. Sec.,
supra note 99, at 2. In such environments, prepayment penalties can operate to increase
default risk by slowing down prepayment speeds. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note
4, at 7.
102. Keith S. Ernst, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Borrowers Gain No Interest Rate
Benefits from Prepayment Penalties on Subprime Mortgages (January 2005), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr05-PPPInterestRate-0105.pdf. But see Michael
LaCour-Little, Call Protection in Mortgage Contracts 2-27 (2005) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=881618 (in a
study of loans made by one subprime lender, finding that prepayment penalties were
correlated with a reduction in the interest rate).
103. Dona DeZube, Predatory Pandemonium, Mortgage Banking, Apr. 2003, at 26, 32;
see also Richard Beidl, A Balancing Act; eMortgage, Mortgage Banking, Apr. 2003, at 95.
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senior-subordinate structure, not due diligence, to protect them from credit
risk.1 04
In recent years, three developments have prompted some investment
banks, loan aggregators, 10 5 and investors to intensify their due diligence on
subprime RMBS. First, in June 2003, a federal jury issued a $50.9 million
verdict against Lehman Brothers for aiding and abetting First Alliance
Mortgage Corp. (popularly known as "FAMCO") in defrauding subprime
borrowers.106 The verdict sent shock waves throughout the securitization
world because Lehman Brothers was found liable in part, as FAMCO's
investment bank and warehouse lender, for faulty due diligence on
FAMCO's securitized loans. 10 7 Second, some states, including Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New Mexico, enacted new anti-predatory
lending laws that hold assignees of subprime loans, who fail to conduct
adequate due diligence to exclude high-cost loans from securitization pools,
liable for loan originators' predatory practices. 10 8 Finally, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have started buying the better subprime loans and their higher
due diligence requirements have forced loan originators to do more due
diligence of their own.10 9 As we will discuss in Part VI.C below, the extent
and nature of this due diligence varies widely.
F. Deal Provisions
Secondary market purchasers also demand contractual protections to
mitigate the lemons problem. 110 These contractual provisions are designed
to shift part or all of the credit risk back onto lenders. The rating agencies
104. See Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 38.
105. See infra Part VIA.
106. See Erick Bergquist, Experts Say Lehman Case Is Warning, Not Precedent, Am.
Banker, June 18, 2003, at 6.
107. Cf Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 659-65
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (findings of fact). Lehman Brothers allegedly learned of FAMCO's
fraud during due diligence and nevertheless gave FAMCO "substantial assistance" in
financing FAMCO's operations through securitization. See Anand S. Raman et al., Cutting
the Risks Built into Third-Party Lending Relationships, ABA Banking J., July 2003, at 61.
More generally, Professor Christopher Peterson would impose imputed liability on
investment banks that structure predatory securitizations. See Christopher L. Peterson,
Predatory Structured Finance (Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Fordham Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=929118.
108. See infra notes 243-60 and accompanying text.
109. Neil J. Morse, Not Exactly Prime, Mortgage Banking, June 2003, at 60 [hereinafter
Morse, Not Exactly Prime]; Neil J. Morse, The Compliance Battle, Mortgage Banking, Sept.
2003, at 28 [hereinafter Morse, The Compliance Battle]; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office (GAO), GAO-04-280, Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face
Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending 79-81 (2004). For discussion of Fannie Mae's
and Freddie Mac's due diligence standards for A- mortgages, see infra notes 266-67 and
accompanying text.
110. See generally Karen B. Gelernt, Comment: Avoiding Predator Risk in the Secondary
Market, Am. Banker, July 7, 2000, at 9 (recommending contractual protections that investors
should demand when assessing offerings and originators).
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consistently laud these and other provisions as effectively insulating
investors from the risk of lemon loans. As one Fitch representative stated
in 2004, "'Issuers have provided protective measures to significantly reduce
transaction risk and investor assignee liability from predatory lending. '
1. Representations and Warranties
Lenders provide representations and warranties to investors in subprime
deals. 112 Some of these provisions are specifically designed to guard
against the credit risk and litigation risk of predatory loans. Thus, rating
agencies, underwriters, and investors insist that lenders warrant that all
loans in the loan pool comply with applicable laws, including consumer
protection laws. 113 Sometimes lenders also must provide representations
and warranties that all loan applicants' reported salaries fall within a
reasonable range of salaries for their specific profession and locale. 114
2. Recourse and Collateral Substitution Clauses
Similarly, investment banks and rating agencies may insist on recourse
clauses that require lenders to take back loans if specific events occur.1 15
Events that can trigger recourse clauses include borrower default16 or
evidence that the loans contain prohibited terms.'1 7 Similarly, collateral
substitution clauses require lenders to substitute performing loans for loans
that go into default. Recourse clauses and collateral substitution clauses are
111. Patrick Crowley, Report Says Predatory Lending Issues Mostly Resolved for RMBS
Issuers, Servicers, Mortgage Daily, Jan. 5, 2004 (quoting Tom Albertson, Senior Dir., Fitch
Ratings), available at http://www.mortgagedaily.comiRatingsSubprime0I0504.asp; cf
Moody's Investor Service, Predatory Lending and Home Equity Securitizations 1 (Apr. 28,
2000) (stating that allegations of predatory lending were unlikely to "have a widespread
negative effect on the credit quality of outstanding securitizations... because many
securitizations of subprime mortgage loans are fully insured by a monoline bond insurer").
112. This occurs more often in public offerings than in Rule 144A private placements.
See Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 28, 31; infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (June 2004); Citigroup
Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001) (Banamex); Citigroup Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600
(Sept. 2001) (EAB); Chase Manhattan Corp., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001); S&P, supra
note 31, at 32; Morse, The Compliance Battle, supra note 109.
114. See Jody Shenn, How Lenders Cut Risk on Low-Doc Loans, Am. Banker, Oct. 26,
2004, at 6m.
115. See S&P, supra note 31, at 33; Eggert, supra note 2, at 541-42, 548; Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Limits OfLawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 Tex. L. Rev.
1, 3, 4 n.12 (2005). Not all subprime securitizations include recourse provisions. As of
September 2005, for instance, Option One's secondary market resales of subprime home
loans were made exclusively on a nonrecourse basis. See Q1 2006 H&R Block, Inc. Earnings
Conference Call, supra note 90.
116. See Michaud, supra note 37, at 272. In a parallel phenomenon in response to the
issuance of the FTC Rule, lenders began insisting that merchants agree to recourse
provisions obligating the merchants to purchase notes from the lenders if the borrowers were
"dissatisfied." Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form
over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 363, 430 (2002).
117. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 527.
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meant to redress the lemons problem 1 8 by making lenders internalize the
risk of loans that go into default or that violate the law.
3. Requiring Lenders to Retain Servicing Rights
Some securitization deals require lenders to retain loan servicing rights.
Doing so gives lenders incentives to maximize creditworthiness because
servicing costs go up as default risk rises. 119 A lender who securitizes its
loans but retains the servicing rights has a direct stake in timely repayment,
because collection becomes costly when loans become delinquent or go into
default. Thus, when lenders retain the servicing rights, they have incentives
to hold down credit risk when making loans.
G. Credit-Default Swaps
Wall Street has created a new type of derivative that provides added
protection to investors from the credit risk associated with abusive lending.
This derivative, called a "credit-default swap," functions like an insurance
policy and pays off investors when default rates in a loan pool exceed a
specified level.' 20 These derivatives enable investors to purchase securities
backed by predatory loans and then hedge against potential losses if
borrowers are unable to repay the loans.
VI. WHY PREDATORY LENDING PERSISTS DESPITE RISK MANAGEMENT
The mechanisms that protect investors from risk should also exert
discipline on subprime lenders by forcing them to retain some of the risk
associated with the loan pools. All of these measures are designed to give
lenders incentives to make good loans and thereby cut default risk.
Nevertheless, none of these measures, singly or together, has curbed
abusive lending. 121 In this section, we explain why predatory lending
persists despite attempts at market discipline by the secondary market.
118. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 3, 24.
119. See Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 4-5 (Harvard Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working
Paper BABC 04-19, 2004).
120. Mark Whitehouse, As Home Owners Face Strains, Market Bets on Loan Defaults,
Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 2006, at Al.
121. A 2004 report by The Reinvestment Fund documented the incidence of predatory
lending in home loan refinance transactions. See The Reinvestment Fund, Predatory
Lending: An Approach to Identify and Understand Predatory Lending (2004), available at
http://www.trfund.com/policy/predatory.lending.htm; see also Quercia, Stegman & Davis,
supra note 4. Between 1998 and 2005, the Federal Trade Commission prosecuted predatory
lending cases against home mortgage lenders and brokers including Action Loan Co., Amor
Mortgage, Abacus Mortgage, Associates First Capital Corp., Barry Cooper Properties,
Capital City Mortgage Corp., Capitol Mortgage Corp., Chase Financial Funding, Inc., CLS
Financial Services, Inc., Delta Funding Corp., Fairbanks Capital Corp., First Alliance
Mortgage Company, First Plus Financial Group, Inc., Fleet Finance and Home Equity
U.S.A., Granite Mortgage, LLC, Interstate Resource Corp., LAP Financial Services, Inc.,
Mark Diamond, Mercantile Mortgage Co., Nationwide Mortgage Corp., NuWest, Inc., PWR
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Processing, Inc., R.A. Walker & Assocs., and Wasatch Credit Corp. See Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Efforts to Combat
Unfair and Deceptive Subprime Lending Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 3-8,
Feb. 24, 2004, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2004/02/02242004subprimelendingtest.pdf;
Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Sandra F. Braunstein, Dir., Fed.
Reserve Sys. Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs (Feb. 23, 2005), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/05030lenforcemntrpt.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Capital City Mortgage Corp. Defendant Settles with FTC (May 14, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/sanne.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Capital City
Mortgage Settles FTC Charges (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/capitalcity.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC
Challenges Bogus Mortgage Loan Brokers (June 1, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/pwrprocessing.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC, DOJ and HUD Announce Action to Combat Abusive Lending Practices, (Mar. 30,
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/03/deltafunding.htm; Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, FTC: Mortgage Broker's Deceptive Claims Tricked Consumers Looking
for a Good Rate (June 2, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/
chasefinancial.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Home Equity Lenders Settle
Charges that They Engaged in Abusive Lending Practices; Over Half Million Dollars To Be
Returned to Consumers (July 29, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/07/hoepa.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Home
Mortgage Lender Settles "Predatory Lending" Charges (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/famco.htm; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Midwest
Mortgage Lender Agrees to Settle Illegal Lending Charges Brought by FTC, HUD, and State
of Illinois, (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/
mercantilediamond.htm; Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Subprime Lending Cases (since 1998),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/subprimelendingcases.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
In April 2004, the Office of Thrift Supervision entered into a supervisory agreement with
Ocwen Federal Bank designed to eliminate alleged predatory loan servicing practices.
Supervisory Agreement, Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB and Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS
Docket No. 04592 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/9/93606.pdf.
The following month, Citigroup Inc. and its subprime mortgage subsidiary, Citifinancial
Credit Company, agreed to a cease-and-desist order in which the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System imposed a $70 million civil money penalty for alleged predatory
lending practices. Timothy L. O'Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan
Abuse, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2004, at Cl; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. (May 27, 2004), available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
press/enforcement/2004/20040527/default.htm. The 2004 Citigroup order followed on the
heels of an earlier $215 million settlement by Citigroup Inc. in 2002 to resolve FTC charges
of predatory lending. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges
Against the Associates Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept.
19, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.htm.
In 2005, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) similarly issued agency
sanctions against Chicago Title Insurance Company for fraudulent home loan settlement
practices. See OCC, Stipulation and Consent Order, In re Chicago Title Ins. Co., #2005-12
(Feb. 24, 2005), available at www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2005-12.pdf. Finally, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has pursued mortgage fraud aggressively. See, e.g., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Chris Swecker Before the House Finan. Services
Subcomm. On Housing and Community Opportunity (Oct. 7, 2004), available at
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/sweckerl00704.htm; Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Financial Crimes Report to the Public (May 2005), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fmancial/fcs-report052005/fcs-report52005.htm (reporting
on investigations into equity skimming, property flipping and mortgage-related identity
theft). In 2006, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia reached a $325 million
settlement with Ameriquest Mortgage Company over alleged predatory lending practices.
See, e.g., Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Miller: Ameriquest Will Pay $325 Million
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A. The Unholy Alliance of Marginal Lenders and Loan Aggregators
Increasingly, subprime lenders are selling whole loans to outside loan
aggregators, who bundle and securitize them. Generally, such aggregators
are affiliates of Wall Street investment banks. Major players include Credit
Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Bear, Steams &
Co., Merrill Lynch, Greenwich Capital, UBS, Bank of America, and
Deutsche Bank Securities. 122
Subprime aggregation is popular because it offers advantages to both
investment banks and lenders. These advantages are particularly strong for
small or poorly capitalized lenders. Aggregation permits these lenders to
sell loan pools for securitization that would otherwise be too small to
provide diversification. More importantly, aggregation enables marginal
lenders to obtain financing despite obscure or questionable reputations by
"renting" the aggregator's reputation for quality securities.
Wall Street prizes aggregation because it helps boost investment banks'
underwriting business and helps them assemble diversified loan pools.
Furthermore, it allows investment banks to enjoy subprime profits with
reduced legal risk, assuming that the aggregators qualify as holders in due
course and do not participate in underwriting loans. Because they have
minimal exposure to suits, aggregators have reduced incentives to guard
against abusive practices.
B. Lenders Do Not Always Retain an Interest in the Subordinated Tranches
In the process of providing credit enhancements, the lender (through an
affiliate) often buys securities in the subordinated tranches, which are rated
double- or single-B or are simply unrated. 123 While this makes it appear
and Reform its Lending Practices (Jan. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest-news/releases/jan-2006/Ameriquest-lowa.html.
122. Loan aggregation is also known as warehouse lending, conduit lending, or "principal
finance." The aggregation business has boomed, accounting for 42% of subprime
securitizations in 2002. See Morse, Not Exactly Prime, supra note 109; Shepherd, supra note
29; Bonnie Sinnock, Morgan Stanley Sees Technology as Key to 'Strong Credit Culture,'
Nat'l Mortgage News, Mar. 28, 2005, at 3.
123. See Jody Shenn, Where's Mortgage Risk? New Answers Emerging, Am. Banker,
May 11, 2005, at 1. Subordinated tranches comprised only a small fraction of the
proceeds-no more than fifteen percent-from all RMBS tranches rated by S&P through
2004 (including subprime tranches). Investment-grade tranches (rated BBB or higher and
bought by outside investors) accounted for the remaining eighty-five percent. See S&P,
Rating Transitions 2004, supra note 84, at 5 tbl.4; see also Blum & DiAngelo, supra note
33, at 253; Frank L. Raiter, Risk-Based Pricing Nonagency Mortgages and Securities, in
Subprime Consumer Lending 145, 151 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1999). Subprime RMBS are
often issued through limited offerings or private placements. Under the Securities Act of
1933 and SEC regulations, few private individuals qualify to buy investment-grade subprime
RMBS through unregistered offerings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2006). Instead,
institutional investors (banks and thrifts, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds,
and, to a minor degree, hedge funds) plus foreign entities buy the vast majority of those
securities. See Hayre, supra note 40, at 11-12; Ruth Simon et al., Housing-Bubble Talk
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that the lender retains the riskiest securities, this is not necessarily the case.
Instead, outside investors buy many of these so-called "residuals," some at
the time of offering and others through later secondary market resales. 124
There is strong demand by outside investors (principally real estate
investment trusts, hedge funds, and overseas investors) for the double- and
single-B subprime tranches. 125  In addition, lenders can resell their
subprime residuals to outside investors through bonds known as
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Essentially, CDOs securitize
residuals from RMBS and other assets. 126 Significantly, U.S. subprime
Doesn't Scare Off Foreigners, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at Al; Infovest 21 LLC, supra
note 99.
124. For lenders who are regulated depository institutions or their operating subsidiaries,
regulatory accounting principles may compel the sale of the double- or single-B tranches.
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 15, at 1069 & n.36, 1070, 1089 & n.131. Even when lenders retain
subprime residuals, they can mitigate their credit risk through conventional mortgage
insurance on the underlying mortgages or credit-default swaps that hedge the risk. See, e.g.,
Countrywide Financial Corporation Analyst Meeting-Final, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire,
May 24, 2005 (explaining that "one of the ways that we get down to a lower, net residual
position on the sub prime is due to use of mortgage insurance"); Simon & Hagerty, supra
note 49. Additionally, the persistence of predatory lending despite retained residuals may
suggest that predatory lending is so profitable-largely due to up-front fees and proceeds
from securitization-that those profits generally offset the financial risks of holding the
residuals.
125. See James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Mortgage Risk: A Hot Export, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 22, 2005, at Cl; lacobucci & Winter, supra note 15, at 188-89; Sarah Mulholland,
Single-B HEL Classes Emerge: Yield-Hungry Buyers Driving Trend, Asset Securitization
Rep., Aug. 9, 2004; Simon et al., supra note 123; see also Countrywide Financial
Corporation Analyst Meeting-Final, supra note 124 (observing that the "ability to sell
residuals or the bottom pieces in the credit . . . spectrum whether it [is] double digits or
single digits ... has been substantially broadened in the last few years as a number of
investors have reached down the credit curve for a greater yield"); Kevin Donovan, Large
HEL ABS Beefs Up Otherwise Slow U.S. ABS Market, Asset Securitization Rep., Feb. 2,
2004, (describing a home equity securitization with single-B plus rated bonds and noting
"the strong demand for mezzanine and sub classes").
126. As such, the CDO market provides liquidity for RMBS, including subprime
securities. "Through retranching and diversification, CDOs produce higher-rated securities
from lower-rated ones." Shenn, supra note 123, at 1, 10. For helpful introductions to CDOs,
see S&P, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria 4-13 (2002) [hereinafter S&P,
Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria], and Olivier Cousseran & Im~ne Rahmouni,
The CDO Market: Functioning and Implications in Terms of Financial Stability, 6 Fin.
Stability Rev. 43, 44 (2005). The authors are indebted to Kevin Byers for his insights on
CDOs and NIMS. A typical CDO might contain subprime RMBS with a weighted average
rating as low as BB+, meaning that many of those securities are rated below investment
grade. See, e.g., Fitch Rates Duke Funding VIII, Ltd./Corp "AAA/AA/A-/BBB,' Bus. Wire,
Apr. 5, 2005; Fitch Rates Glacier Funding CDO II, Ltd 'AAA/AAA/AA/BBB/BB,' Bus. Wire,
Oct. 12, 2004; Fitch Rates G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd./Corp., Bus. Wire, Mar. 16, 2005; Fitch
Rates Newcastle CDO VI, Ltd. 'Fl +/AAA/AAA/AA/A/BBB,' Bus. Wire, Apr. 19, 2005; Fitch
Rates Northwall Funding CDO L Ltd./Inc., Bus. Wire, May 17, 2005; Fitch Rates Sorin Real
Estate CDO L Ltd., Bus. Wire, July 21, 2005; G-STAR 2004-4 Rated 'AAA/AA/A-/BBB' by
Fitch Ratings, Bus. Wire, Aug. 12, 2004; see also Allison Pyburn, Merrill Finds Less Risk in
CDO Collateral Versus HEL ABS Market, Asset Securitization Rep., Aug. 8, 2005 (noting
that CDOs are "highly exposed to subordinate [subprime] ABS bonds"); Shenn, supra note
123, at 1. One S&P study of CDOs found that the weighted average rating of subprime
RMBS backing CDOs dropped from A in 2003 to BBB in 2004. See S&P, CDO Spotlight:
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RMBS have comprised the single "largest collateral asset class in [CDOs]
since the inception of the product in 1999. ' 127
A central purpose of residuals is to force lenders to retain the bulk of the
credit risk they create. 128 However, when lenders with subprime residuals
shift them off their books through CDOs, 129 they are able to escape the
market discipline that residuals were meant to exert. As one CDO manager
U.S. CDO of ABS Collateral Composition and Performance 6 (2004) [hereinafter S&P,
CDO Spotlight: U.S. CDO of ABS Collateral Composition and Performance]. Any CDO
with a weighted average rating of BBB or lower is likely to be backed in part by double- or
single-B bonds.
127. FitchRatings, supra note 7, at 1; see also S&P, CDO Spotlight: U.S. CDO of ABS
Collateral Composition and Performance, supra note 126, at 4; Morgenson, supra note 84.
128. See Hurst, supra note 62, at 285 (observing that "[r]etention of [the residual] by the
seller-servicer provides a primary motivation to maximize the cash flow in the trust (i.e.,
accelerate collections and minimize losses) so that the value of the residual is realized").
129. See FitchRatings, supra note 7, at 1; S&P, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO
Criteria, supra note 126, at 21 (stating that CDO managers "have an appetite not only for
senior tranches, but also for mezzanine pieces in senior-subordinated transactions, typically
rated in the range of 'BBB' to 'BB'); Hagerty & Simon, supra note 125 ("CDOs... are the
biggest buyers of the riskier types of mortgage securities .... ); Nomura Installing Sub-
Piece Fund, Asset-Backed Alert, Nov. 28, 2003, at 2 (describing Nomura's plans to organize
a CDO conduit to "present[] asset-backed issuers with a ready-made buyer for their hard-to-
sell B pieces"); Shenn, supra note 123, at 10 (describing two subprime transactions and
noting that "a healthy appetite for [CDOs] among foreign investors, pension funds, and
hedge funds has let many [subprime] securitizers pass lower-quality bonds to CDO
underwriters"); see also Infovest 21 LLC, supra note 99 (interviewing a CDO manager who
stated that "we might be comfortable buying a single B"); S&P, CDO Spotlight: U.S. CDO
of ABS Collateral Composition and Performance, supra note 126, at 4; Janet M. Tavakoli,
Collateralized Debt Obligations and Structured Finance: New Developments in Cash and
Synthetic Securitization 261 (2003); H&R Block, Inc. Annual Investment Community
Conference, New York City-F, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Jan. 10, 2006 (announcing
"we're going to be more aggressive at monetizing and moving those residuals on a more
recurring basis"); National City Corp. Analysts' Conference-Final, FD (Fair Disclosure)
Wire, May 26, 2005 (announcing that "we... basically sold the portion of that risk that
corresponded from single-A down to double-B"); Allison Pybum, Terwin Priced High Resi
Concentration CDO, Asset Securitization Rep., May 9, 2005 (announcing first CDO, named
Northwall I, issued by Terwin Money Management LLC; deal contained 86.5% of subprime
RMBS and "[r]oughly 35% of the assets backing the deal came off of Terwin's books"); Q4
2005 Ocwen Financial. Earnings Conference Call-F, FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire, Jan. 26,
2006 (announcing Ocwen's plan to "target acquisitions of residual securities" to hedge its
mortgage servicing operations); Jody Shenn, Pipeline: Too Excited?, Am. Banker, May 26,
2005, at 11 (explaining that the fact that subprime "originators might not want to hold on to
credit risks in this environment" fuels CDOs); cf Countrywide Financial Corp. Analyst
Meeting-Final, supra note 124 (announcing a new Countrywide private equity fund called
Sunfish "investing[] almost exclusively in [Countrywide] sub prime residuals" that enabled
Countrywide to "offload[] ... 100 percent of our residual"; stating that Countrywide was
likewise considering issuing CDOs because "we have the product to fill the CDO"; noting
that "in the CDO market all the equity gets sold out, much of the equity is not retained");
Andreas A. Jobst, Risk Management of CDOs During Times of Stress, Derivatives Week,
Nov. 28, 2005, at 8 ("CDO managers are frequently exposed to the equity tranche, which
absorbs first losses and, hence, represents the riskiest element .... ).
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put it, CDOs create "an awful lot of moral hazard in the [subprime RMBS]
sector."
130
C. Due Diligence Is Often Cursory
Despite recent spurs to action from the Lehman Brothers case and state
assignee liability laws, industry and government observers agree that
subprime due diligence is uneven and in need of improvement. 13 1 This is
true for public offerings of subprime RMBS, where institutional investors
often have a real chance to insist on meaningful due diligence in advance,
and even more so for Rule 144A private placements. 132 There is such
intense demand for Rule 144A offerings that institutional investors usually
have to make snap judgments whether to invest without time for any
substantive due diligence; most simply rely on lenders, underwriters, and
rating agencies, even though none of these entities has the same level of
interest in avoiding credit losses as the investors themselves. Thus, due
diligence in the private-label subprime market often shoots low and almost
never attempts to filter out predatory loan terms or practices unless they are
observationally illegal.
1. What Subprime Due Diligence Means Today
In subprime deals, underwriters, rating agencies, and lenders, not
investors, conduct most due diligence. Due diligence is typically limited to
determining lender compliance with state and federal consumer protection
laws. 133 For example, automated compliance systems tailor their screening
tools to the legal requirements of each jurisdiction. 134 Similarly, the rating
agencies only require screening for legal compliance and nothing more. 135
130. Allison Pybum, CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment, Asset
Securitization Rep., May 9, 2005; accord Jody Shenn, MBS Pioneer Has Concerns: Risk-
Passing, GSE Reforms, Commercial Realty, Am. Banker, June 19, 2006, at 1.
131. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 109, at 81; Beidl, supra note 103; Neil J. Morse, Making
and Selling Good Loans, Mortgage Banking, June 2003, at 107; Morse, supra note 99;
Shenn, supra note 114.
132. Rule 144A governs private placements of securities, typically to institutional
investors. See infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
133. This is evident both from industry descriptions of the limited due diligence
performed and from statements by banking attorneys about the need for improved reviews of
legal compliance. See, e.g., The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 479,
499 n.51 (2004) (addressing an investment bank, which, in representations to the Federal
Reserve Board, limited its description of its due diligence reviews of subprime
securitizations to "evaluations to determine if the lenders are complying with federal and
state laws"); Bank of America Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 217, 224 & n.35 (2004) (same).
None of these statements discusses compliance with industry standards or even aspires to
such compliance. See Shenn, supra note 114.
134. See ComplianceEase, ComplianceAnalyzer: Automated Compliance Solutions,
http://www.complianceease.com.
135. See, e.g., FitchRatings, Can You See Me Now? Screening for RMBS Predatory
Lending Loans (Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/
03/fitch 1l 12.pdf [hereinafter FitchRatings, Can You See Me Now?]; S&P, Anti-Predatory
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Limiting due diligence to legal compliance is problematic, given the
large existing gaps in governing law. Today, numerous lending abuses
remain legal under state and federal law. 136 The principal federal anti-
predatory lending law, HOEPA, 137 has strong proscriptions but at best
covers the costliest five percent of subprime home loans. 138 Similarly,
many states lack strong anti-predatory lending laws.139  With legal
protections against abusive subprime loans weak in many states and at the
federal level, the absence of meaningful due diligence paves the way for
inclusion of predatory loans in securitized loan pools.
When due diligence is required, it is not uncommon for some lenders to
honor that requirement in the breach, i.e., to say they performed loan-level
review when they did not. In 2004, the General Accounting Office (now
the Government Accountability Office or GAO) looked at this issue and
concluded that "some companies may be more willing than others to
purchase loans that are considered questionable in terms of legal
compliance, creditworthiness, or other factors."' 140 As one subprime lender
explained to the press, "We're not structured to do 100 percent due
diligence [on certain subprime loan pools], even though Wall Street
investment banks might want that. ' 141 Lenders who offer low- or no-
documentation loans are even more prone to skip compliance review. 142
In the conforming market, both government-sponsored entities do require
substantive screening of subprime loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have best practices standards for residential mortgages to borrowers with
Lending Alert: Standard & Poor's Revises Criteria Related to Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
(May 13, 2004); Press Release, FitchRatings, Fitch Ratings Updates Rating Criteria
Regarding Predatory Loans (Jan. 15, 2004); Press Release, FitchRatings, Fitch Revises
RMBS Guidelines for Antipredatory Lending Laws (Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter
FitchRatings, Fitch Revises RMBS Guidelines].
136. See Azmy, supra note 70. Other federal and state laws of a general nature regulate
aspects of predatory lending, but those laws have not succeeded in stamping out numerous
predatory lending abuses. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1299-1317.
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000).
138. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, 65608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
139. See Azmy, supra note 70.
140. GAO, supra note 109, at 81. Some issuers and servicers apparently still put too
much effort into checking for facial, rather than actual, compliance. As one attorney
cautioned subprime servicers, "[R]eviewing written policies and procedures tells only half
the story. It is imperative also to understand how those policies and procedures are
implemented in practice." Andrew L. Sandier et al., Risk Management in Mortgage Loan
Servicing and Collection, 71 Rev. Banking & Fin. Servs. 71 (2004) (listing due diligence
checklist).
141. Morse, supra note 99, at 56-57.
142. See Shenn, supra note 114, at 6m ("'The scary [lenders] are the ones that use [Alt-A
loans] as an additional menu item' without performing any additional controls." (quoting
Paul Fischer, Exec. Vice Pres. of Risk Management, Radian Group Inc.). These so-called
low-doc and no-doc loans make up a growing segment of the subprime market. See, e.g.,
S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products: Subprime Sector First-Quarter 2005,
charts 2, 6 (July 14, 2005).
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blemished credit that are stricter in some respects than the laws in many
jurisdictions. 143
Outside of the conforming market, lenders, issuers, and/or major
investors are free to adopt internal standards of their own. 144 Nonetheless,
usually only market actors with high reputational risk, such as bank holding
companies contemplating mergers or lenders previously sanctioned for
abusive lending, go to such lengths.145 For most other private-label market
participants, industry self-policing is virtually nonexistent. Thus, in the
nonconforming market for subprime RMBS, lenders and underwriters
rarely screen out loans that are not prohibited by law, even if those loans
violate industry standards or inflict significant harm on borrowers.
Furthermore, underwriters are under constant pressure to relax their due
diligence, for fear that lenders will move their underwriting business to
other underwriting firms.
In sum, the subprime secondary market has not adopted industry best
practices voluntarily and will not screen out predatory loans from loan
pools unless compelled to by statute, regulations, or court orders.' 46
2. Impediments to Meaningful Due Diligence by Investors
When it comes to screening out predatory loans, investors generally rely
on due diligence by rating agencies, underwriters, and lenders. With
advance opportunity, institutional investors will generally review the
disclosures, ratings, structure, and credit enhancements. Otherwise, they
143. See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished Credit
Records, Lender Letter No. 03-00 (Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Fannie Mae, Lender Letter
No. 03-00], available at http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2000/
lendltrs2000.pdf; Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Promotes Consumer Choice with
New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy (Dec. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/afford-housing/2003/consumer-120403.html;
Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Will No Longer Invest in Subprime Mortgages
with Prepayment Penalty Terms Greater Than Three Years (Mar. 1 2002), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/ archives2002/subprime_030102.htm; Letter from
Freddie Mac to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, Freddie Mac's Stance Against
Predatory Lending Practices (Dec. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/1228indltr.pdf; Letter from Freddie Mac
to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, Reports to Credit Repositories (Feb. 22, 2000),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/2indltr.pdf; Letter from
Freddie Mac to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, Single-Premium Credit Insurance
Products (Apr. 21, 2000), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/
pdf/42 1 indltr.pdf. The Mortgage Bankers Association has adopted weaker, nonbinding best
practices standards for residential mortgages. Mortgage Bankers Association of America,
MBA Best Practices, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/IndustryResources/StandardsandBest
Practices/MBABestPractices.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
144. See, e.g., Raman et al., supra note 107 (recommending the incorporation of specific
best practices standards into screening criteria). See supra note 32 for discussion of the
differences between the conforming and nonconforming or private label markets.
145. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (2004).
146. See Jennifer Harmon, 'Purchaser Can't Test for Compliance in Secondary,' Nat'l
Mortgage News, June 7, 2004, at 32.
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tend to be passive, especially regarding predatory lending concerns. 147
Only rarely do investors inspect loan files for fraud. 148 Similarly, investors
rarely reserve the right post-closing to be notified of predatory lending
complaints, to conduct random spot checks, or to perform special audits of
lenders when warning signs of predatory lending crop up.149 Yet after-the-
fact monitoring may be the only way to detect certain types of loan fraud
and predatory servicing. 150
Even if investors wanted to engage in more extensive due diligence on
their own, market and legal forces would often impede their efforts. To
begin with, numerous subprime securitizations are floated on a to-be-
announced basis. In TBA offerings, when investors buy their securities, the
loans have not yet been pooled, leaving the content of the pool up to the
lender's discretion. 151 While investors can reserve the right to review the
eventual loan pool post-closing, that is a risky proposition because they lose
much of their leverage once they part with their funds.
The law on Rule 144A placements also impedes effective due diligence.
Growing numbers of subprime RMBS offerings are issued as Rule 144A
private placements, rather than as public offerings under section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933.152 Before 1990, limited offerings and private
placements under Rule 144153 lacked liquidity because investors could not
resell their securities for two years without costly registration under section
5.154 To remedy this situation, the Securities and Exchange Commission
147. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 543-44.
148. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase & Co., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 352 (2004) (describing JP
Morgan's "loan sampling process [as including] obtaining a secondary value on the
mortgaged property, performing cost tests before purchase, and performing targeted reviews
of purchased loans"); Bank of America Corp., 90 Fed. Res. Bull. 217 & n.35 (2004)
(describing loan sampling); Citigroup Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (2001) (EAB); Citigroup
Inc., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (2001) (Banamex). But see Mark L. Korell, The Workings of
Private Mortgage Bankers and Securitization Conduits, in A Primer on Securitization, supra
note 37, at 99-100 (reporting that some investors are asking private mortgage conduits to
"dig out data on the underlying loans in individual pools"); Jody Shenn, New Bear Stearns
Unit to Provide Collateralfor MBS, Am. Banker, Apr. 20, 2005, at 10.
149. Cf Sandler et al., supra note 140, at 75 ("One of the most effective risk management
tools available to non-prime servicers is a process to address customer complaints promptly
and professionally, with an appropriate audit oversight to review and improve the process.").
Red flags can include press reports of predatory lending allegations, higher-than-expected
delinquency or default rates, borrower complaints, government investigations, and predatory
lending lawsuits.
150. See Baron, supra note 37, at 90; see also infra notes 218-30 and accompanying text.
151. See Boudoukh et al., supra note 60, at 410, 419; Downing, Jaffee & Wallace, supra
note 54, at 6-7.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2000); see Dominion Bond Rating Service, U.S. Structured
Finance Newsletter, Mar. 28, 2005, available at
http://cache.dbrs.com/pdf/1112204169687.pdftransactionlD= 109714 (listing recent Rule
144A subprime RMBS offerings).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1989). In 1997, the SEC reduced the holding period under
Rule 144 to one year. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145,
62 Fed. Reg. 9242 (Feb. 28, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2006)).
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(SEC) issued Rule 144A in 1990.155 Rule 144A states that if a private
placement or limited offering is offered or sold solely to parties who are
reasonably believed to be qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), those
investors can resell the securities at any time to other QIBs without
registration. 15 6
In order for a private placement to qualify for Rule 144A treatment,
domestic issuers must provide prospective purchasers with some scant
information upon request, as follows: (a) a "very brief' statement of the
nature of the issuer's products, services, and business; and (b) the issuer's
financial statements (including balance sheets, profit and loss statements,
and retained earnings statements) for the past two years. The information
must be "reasonably current" and financial statements "should be audited to
the extent reasonably available."'1 57 For RMBS, servicers or trustees also
need to provide "basic, material information concerning the structure of the
securities and distributions thereon, the nature, performance and servicing
of the assets supporting the securities, and any credit enhancement
mechanism associated with the securities." 158
The key point here is that Rule 144A does not require issuers to provide
prospective purchasers anything beyond basic information about the risk
profile of the loan pool. As a result, investors do not have access to the
information they need to screen out predatory loans. Because Rule 144A
transactions allow resales to QIBs, these offerings are in high demand.
"Transactions are usually bought and sold very quickly[,] thereby giving the
buyer very little opportunity to conduct due diligence."' 159 Thus, in the Rule
144A market, "liquidity comes at a price."'1 60 The "lack of sufficient
disclosure" and "very little opportunity for due diligence" deprives Rule
144A investors of "the protections accorded to investors in registered public
bond offerings."' 161
155. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1990).
156. Id.; see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 95, at 1408-10.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (2006).
158. Id. § 230.144A(d)(4); Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No.
33,6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (Apr. 30, 1990); Kutak Rock & Campbell, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1273 (Nov. 29, 1990) (declining to answer questions
regarding the adequacy of Rule 144A disclosures for mortgage-backed securities). Even
these minimal disclosures are relaxed if the issuer is a reporting company under sections 13
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is exempt from such reporting under SEC
Rule 12g3-2(b), is a foreign government, or falls within a category of certain private foreign
issuers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i). In 2005, the SEC promulgated new Regulation AB,
which revamped mandatory disclosures for public offerings of mortgage-backed securities to
include information regarding the composition and performance of the pool, static pool data,
the structure of deals, certain underwriting criteria, and servicing experience. See Asset-
Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506 (Jan. 7, 2005). The new disclosure requirements do
not apply to Rule 144A private placements of mortgage-backed securities, however.
159. Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 28.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Id. The placement agent will normally conduct due diligence of some sort before the
offering and will obtain comfort letters from lawyers and accountants. See id. at 27. Because
2072 [Vol. 75
TURNING A BLIND EYE
The lack of meaningful due diligence by investors is compounded by
weak covenants after the fact. In Rule 144A deals, "buyers are offered very
few covenants and less extensive representations and warranties."'162
Furthermore, the representations and warranties do not survive the closing
of the transactions.1 63 Instead, the assurances "run to the placement agent,
not to the ultimate buyer."'164  As a result, investors cannot rely on
contractual guarantees as a backstop in the absence of due diligence:
Originators try to grant investors as weak a covenant package as possible,
thereby giving the originator as much leeway as possible in terms of what
it can do with the asset. In that respect, some of the originator's best
assets could be long gone before the senior secured investor finds out and
given the weak set of representations and warranties that are made at the
time of funding of the transaction, there is ... very little that can be done
at that stage. 
16 5
In sum, due diligence by investors-the people with the most to lose-is hit
or miss, particularly in the Rule 144A market.
D. Recourse Clauses Are Limited in Reach and Are Not Consistently
Enforced
As we already discussed, recourse clauses are relatively common and
require lenders to take back bad loans. Their practical effect is limited,
however, by spotty enforcement. 166 In some cases, lenders refuse to honor
the placement agent does not bear credit risk in the transaction, however, it does not have the
same incentives as investors for more thorough risk assessment.
162. Id. at 28; see also id. at 38 ("[W]ith the advent of Rule 144A offerings, market
practice has done away with the.., finer aspects of private placements such as negotiation
of covenants and due diligence."). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. I11. L. Rev. 1.
163. Shivaswamy, supra note 54, at 28.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 38.
166. See Shenn, supra note 114 (noting that investors rarely attempt to enforce reps and
warranties); Shenn, supra note 123, at 1; Interview with Kevin Byers, Forensic Accountant,
Parkside Assocs. (June 9, 2005). When delinquencies rise, securitized trusts and investment
banks are more likely to insist that originators buy back bad loans, and that is happening
now. Even so, the percentage of affected loans is small. Credit Suisse Group found, for
example, that among 208 subprime RMBS bond deals that it studied for 2005 and 2006, the
dollar value of mortgages repurchased was "well under 1% of the total value of mortgages in
the pools with at least one repurchase." Ruth Simon & Michael Hudson, Bad Loans Draw
Bad Blood, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at Cl. Even this limited enforcement of recourse
clauses is cyclical in nature, and the market has a very short memory. As one commentator
observed, "'In a rising market, even a bad loan is a good loan."' Id. (quoting Nate Redleaf,
Research Analyst, Imperial Capital LLC). In the meantime, recent potential buyers of
subprime lenders have sought "to avoid inheriting the subprime sellers' costly obligation of
having to buy back the loans already sold in the secondary market because of borrowers'
defaults." Lingling Wei, Subprime Lenders Are Hard Sell, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 2006, at C5.
The dictates of federal bankruptcy law also place limits on the scope of recourse clauses.
Under the bankruptcy code, the sale of loans to the SPV must constitute a "true sale" in order
for the receivables to be excluded from the bankruptcy estate in the event of the originator's
failure. See Schwarcz, supra note 38, § 4:1. If recourse exceeds specific levels-generally
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recourse clauses and trustees decide that going to court would be unduly
expensive. 167 In other cases, poorly capitalized lenders or brokers have
gone out of business or lack the funds to buy back their old, nonperforming
loans.' 68 As a prominent industry attorney observed, "[I]f you purchase
loans from small operators, there may not be much water in the well of their
repentance.... If you do postclosing due diligence and you fird 10 percent
of your portfolio is affected, what loan broker, with no capitalization, can
take back the loan?"'169
Even when recourse is successful, investors have to worry about the
quality of the replacement collateral. Lenders who accept recourse must
substitute new loans for the bad loans. However, lenders often obtain deal
provisions that allow them unilaterally to substitute collateral. 170 Thus,
recourse provisions, which are supposed to give lenders incentives to desist
from making predatory loans, actually enable lenders to substitute one bad
loan for another. As one analyst warned,
Once losses eat through the original equity investment, the trading desk
has a huge incentive to stuff the portfolio with high margin, risky assets to
maximize the residual cash flows. If investors choose to participate in
these deals, they need to carefully examine the structural handcuffs that
will prevent [such] trading .... 171
Finally, even if a lender does take back a predatory loan, it will not
necessarily lose money. If the borrower still has equity in the home, the
lender may persuade him or her to refinance the loan, extract new, large
fees, and eventually foreclose. 172
defined as historical levels of losses-then the "true sale" requirement will be defeated. See,
e.g., Bjerre, supra note 2, at 417.
167. Interview with Kevin Byers, supra note 166. Securitized trusts are more willing to
enforce recourse provisions when the market for mortgage-backed securities softens and
default risks rise. Jesse Eisinger, Mortgage Market Begins to See Cracks as Subprime-Loan
Problems Emerge, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at C 1. In the experience of one of the authors,
however, recourse negotiations can take up to two years and still may not result in full
recourse.
168. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 549, 556; Roundtable: Vendors on New Prevention
Tools, New Scams, Am. Banker, Dec. 9, 2005, at 11, 12 [hereinafter Roundtable] (describing
"the ease with which [mortgage] entities morph into different businesses"); Shenn, supra
note 123, at 1.
169. DeZube, supra note 103, at 32.
170. S&P, Rating Affirmations and Their Impact on Investors (Apr. 20, 2005). Such
clauses are permissible in Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT)
structures, which Congress conferred with favored tax status in the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996. See Phillip R. Pollock & Michael E. Shaff, FASIT Flexibility Applied
to Subprime Securitizations, in Subprime Consumer Lending, supra note 123, at 155, 156-57
(stating that a "major benefit of FASITs over REMICs is the ability to add or substitute
assets to the structure after the startup period and to remove collateral").
171. Tavakoli, supra note 129, at 263.
172. Non-bank lenders, in particular, are willing to pursue foreclosure aggressively. See,
e.g., David Leonhardt, Lenders Trying an Alternative to Foreclosure, N.Y. Times, May 4,
2002, at Al (stating that "banks, which service many [loans in default, have] a variety of
financial incentives to work out new terms and avoid foreclosure" and contrasting predatory
lenders, who are willing to aggressively foreclose).
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E. Retained Servicing Rights Are Not the Norm
It is rare these days for lenders to retain servicing rights. Today, the loan
servicing industry is highly concentrated, largely due to economies of scale.
Rather than insist that lenders retain servicing rights-as a way to discipline
lenders-investors or bond insurers usually press them to employ outside
master servicers to ensure a high level of servicing. 173 As a result, the
originator's loan servicing rights are generally sold for a fee to one of a
small group of specialist firms in the field.174 Thus, high potential servicing
costs are not disincentives to lenders making predatory loans.
F. Excess Demand for Subprime Securitizations
Excess demand is a final reason why investors do not screen subprime
RMBS for predatory practices. In 2004, for instance, S&P observed that
"the market for subprime mortgage securities [experienced] significantly
more demand than availability for many issuances." 175  Other observers
concur that the market for subprime RMBS suffers from excess demand. 176
Rule 144A private placements are in short supply because they offer
liquidity. In addition, there is a clamor for subprime RMBS of all types,
driven by portfolio regulation of institutional investors such as banks and
insurance companies. Many institutional investors have legal limits on the
types of investments they can buy for their own account. 177 Given those
limits, high yields make subprime RMBS attractive, 178 particularly when
other legal investments are in the doldrums. Because the demand for bonds
in subprime securitizations exceeds supply, investors are willing to
purchase bonds without engaging in thorough due diligence.
In sum, the risk management mechanisms used by securitization do not
trickle down to deter lending abuses. At the same time, structured finance
173. See McCall & Blum, supra note 34, at 145.
174. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 544.
175. S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products: Subprime Sector, Fourth-
Quarter 2004, at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005).
176. See Morse, Not Exactly Prime, supra note 109, at 63 ("All this investor interest iff
subprime loans is propelled by the mountain of money piling up on the sidelines of the stock
market, fearing entry into that uninviting terrain. 'Mutual funds, hedge funds, private-equity
funds are sitting on a tremendous amount of liquidity,' says Kenneth Slosser, managing
director of investment banking at Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc., Irvine,
California."); Allison Pyburn, Spread Debate Dominates Global ABS Conference in
Barcelona, Asset Securitization Rep., June 20, 2005; see also Lupica, supra note 1, at 630.
177. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Banking Law Manual: Federal Regulation of Financial
Holding Companies, Banks and Thrifts § 7.03[1] (2d ed. 2001); Howell E. Jackson,
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 Wash.
U. L.Q. 319, 352-56 (1999).
178. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow Riskier, and Investors Are Attracted, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 2006, at Cl; Simon et al., supra note 123 ("[Iln an era of low returns,
mortgage-backed securities offer yield-starved investors much higher returns than
government bonds."); Banc of Am. Sec., ABS Research Note, 2 (Feb. 8, 2005) (reporting
that in 1994, "subprime home equity ABS was the best performing ABS sector, followed by
credit card ABS and auto ABS sectors").
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protects investors so well that S&P routinely assures investors that
subprime RMBS "should continue to perform in accordance with
expectations, given the advances in loan level modeling, structural
safeguards, and improvement in loss mitigation techniques."' 179
VII. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION IN RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE SECURITIZATIONS
Securitization successfully protects investors and reaps profits for rating
agencies, lenders, and investment banks, without protecting borrowers from
abusive loans. This situation gives rise to the question: Should the law
create incentives for securitizers to detect and protect against predatory
lending? For the reasons that follow, we answer this question in the
affirmative.
A. Predatory Lending Harms Borrowers and Imposes External Costs on
Communities
Under the current legal regime, borrowers, neighborhoods, and cities bear
the brunt of abusive lending, while securitization insulates investors from
having to internalize those costs. When lenders make loans that borrowers
cannot afford to repay, borrowers can lose their homes to foreclosure.
Others keep their homes only by reducing spending on necessities such as
health insurance, medical bills, day care, and critical home repairs. When
predatory lending results in vacant homes and neighborhood decline, cities
lose tax revenues and must pay for added police protection and other city
services. 180 The total annual cost to homeowners and cities is in the billions
of dollars. 181
B. The Secondary Market Can More Efficiently Bear the Costs of Policing
Predatory Lenders
The deregulation of home mortgage loans and the growth of
nontraditional lending have impeded comparison-shopping and enabled
.lenders to market loans with complex terms that borrowers do not
understand. 182 As a result, many borrowers enter into complex loans
without understanding the terms or their repayment obligations. Currently,
the only effective way for borrowers to ensure that they are not entering
into predatory loans is to hire lawyers, costing several hundred dollars
apiece to review the loan terms and advise them to walk out of closings if
loan terms prove abusive.
179. S&P, supra note 175, at 5.
180. See Engel, supra note 12, at 356-60.
181. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 4, at 5, 27; Eric Stein, Quantifying the
Economic Cost of Predatory Lending (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (estimating losses from predatory lending at $9.1 billion annually).
182. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1275, 1311-12.
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In contrast, the cost of screening out predatory loans from securitized
loan pools is minimal.183 One study estimated that manual review of a loan
file for predatory terms cost $43, or about three percent of origination
costs.184 The same study found that automated review cost approximately
one dollar per loan.' 85 Thus, unlike borrower attorneys, who must review
individual closing files at substantial cost, securitizers can capture
increasing returns to scale by purchasing technology that electronically
reviews files at a fraction of lawyers' costs.
C. Securitization Impedes Borrowers' Ability to Obtain Relieffrom
Predatory Loans
Thinly capitalized lenders and brokers have the most to gain from
securitization because they lack other forms of financing.' 86  For
undercapitalized firms, securitization has two important effects. First, it
enables them to enter the subprime industry by providing them with
financing. 187 Second, it enables them to stay in operation despite low
capital because they can plow the proceeds from securitization into a fresh
set of loans, which in turn can be securitized. In the process, originators
can render themselves judgment-proof from lawsuits by borrowers by
continually shedding their assets through securitization, distributing the
profits to shareholders, and draining the company of capital. 188 As one
183. See Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994:
Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market
Participants, 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 151, 168-69 (2005) (noting that secondary market
actors are in better positions than borrowers to detect "bad" lenders); Siddhartha Venkatesan,
Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More
Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 177, 207-08 (2003)
(discussing ways the secondary market can spread the cost of assignee liability).
184. See Delvin M. Davis & Ellen Schloemer, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Strong
Compliance Systems Support Profitable Lending While Reducing Predatory Practices 6
(2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ip010-ComplianceCosts-
0705.pdf.
185. Id. In a study of mortgage origination costs, the Mortgage Bankers Association
reported that the net operational origination cost averaged $1,485 per loan in 2004. See Press
Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, MBA Releases Annual Cost Study (Oct. 12, 2005),
available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/32173.htm.
186. Hill, supra note 15, at 1065-66, 1073, 1086, 1092-94, 1100, 1102, 1109; Lupica,
supra note 1, at 627, 629-3 1; see also Eggert, supra note 2, at 546, 556-57.
187. As Freddie Mac's former chairman Leland Brendsel observed, "[R]elatively little
capital is required to start a mortgage banking operation ... and even less to become a
mortgage broker. Lenders lacking the necessary net worth can still originate loans for
lenders qualified to sell into the secondary market." Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization's
Role in Housing Finance: The Special Contributions of the Government-Sponsored
Enterprises, in A Primer on Securitization, supra note 37, at 19, 24.
188. When originators dissolve or go bankrupt, borrowers have little or no real recourse.
See Erick Bergquist, Guess What? Loan Buyers Liable Under Federal Law, Am. Banker,
May 7, 2004, at 1.
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commentator put it, "Securitization's structure is designed to divert value
away from the originator."' 89
Even when originators can pay judgments against them, borrowers may
not be able to obtain meaningful relief. A lawsuit against the original
lender or broker cannot halt a foreclosure by the securitized trust.
Similarly, rescission or reformation may be difficult or impossible if loans
are part of securitized loan pools.190
D. Securitization Impedes Work-Outs with Injured Borrowers
Securitization complicates and often blocks work-outs with borrowers
who are harmed by predatory loans. 191 This is because the underlying
securitization contracts tie the trustee's and servicer's hands if they attempt
to negotiate a repayment plan in lieu of foreclosure. The value of the
securities and the amount of their returns are based on cash flows that are
determined, in part, by the loan terms. To protect these cash flows,
securitization contracts typically prohibit changes to the terms of the
underlying loans. In addition, securitization contracts often prohibit
servicers from waiving prepayment penalties and other loan provisions.
Another roadblock arises when subprime lenders securitize prepayment
penalties through bonds known as Net Interest Margin Securities
(NIMS). 192 If a borrower seeks reformation of a predatory loan, the
reformation could be deemed a prepayment, thus triggering prepayment
penalties. Theoretically, the prepayment penalties could be waived as part
of the work-out. However, if the prepayment penalties have been
securitized in a NIMS, contractually they cannot be waived. S&P has
assured this by insisting that issuers and servicers provide representations
and warranties that they will rigidly enforce the prepayment penalties being
securitized. 193
189. Lupica, supra note 1, at 598; see also lacobucci & Winter, supra note 15, at 170;
LoPucki, supra note 1, at 25-30.
190. See Eggert, supra note 2, at 560-66 (discussing the difficulty borrowers encounter if
they seek to restructure a loan that has been securitized).
191. Id. See generally Eggert, supra note 27.
192. See, e.g., S&P, Legal Criteria Reaffirmed for the Securitization of Prepayment
Penalties 1 (May 29, 2002); Press Release, Risk World, Standard & Poors Rates First NIMS
Transaction 1 (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.riskworld.com/PressRel/2000/O0q3/
PROOaO59.htm; Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, Net Interest Margin (NIMs),
http://www.vcallc.com/mailings/additions/net interest.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
193. S&P does allow for exceptions in two instances, both of which erect high barriers to
workouts. First, S&P permits waiver where forgiveness would "maximize recovery of total
proceeds" and is "standard and customary in servicing similar home equity loans." Press
Release, S&P, Standard & Poor's Clarifies Criteria For Prepayment Penalty Income In U.S.
NIMs Transactions (2005). Second, a NIMS based on prepayment penalty income can
"allow the servicer/master servicer to waive prepayment penalties for any other reason," but
only at a steep price. Id. In such cases, S&P requires the issuer either to obtain a guarantee
or deposit funds in escrow to replace any missing future revenues from prepayment
penalties. See id.
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Finally, servicers have reduced incentives to assist borrowers who go into
default. Servicers can earn higher fees if they march borrowers to
foreclosure rather than reform the borrowers' loan terms or reschedule
payments. In short, securitization creates rigidities that make loan work-
outs difficult and often well nigh impossible.
E. Securitization Causes Borrowers to Pay an Excess Risk Premium
Pricing anomalies in the subprime market provide additional support for
our assignee liability proposal. As we discussed, borrowers in the subprime
market often pay prices that exceed their actual risk. For instance, excess
risk premiums arise when originators steer prime-eligible borrowers to
subprime loans. Excess premiums also arise when lenders impose
prepayment penalties on borrowers that are not justified by risk or trade-
offs for lower interest rates. To compound this situation, NIMS make
subprime home loans more expensive by creating a strong, artificial
demand for costly prepayment penalties that result in hefty fees to
borrowers if the penalties are triggered. Ultimately, as excess risk
premiums push up loan costs to borrowers, their default risk rises, too. 194
Because securitization creates incentives for lenders to extract rents from
borrowers, securitization should bear responsibility for the added default
risk.
F. The Holder-In-Due-Course Rule Creates Inequities
The holder-in-due-course rule also creates inequities when loans are
securitized. When loans are sold, borrowers lose the ability to assert
various defenses and affirmative claims against the new holders of the
loans. Thus, the very fact of the loan sale increases the value of the loan to
the assignee with no direct benefit to the borrower. At the same time, the
borrower is harmed by the loss of full legal relief for a problem loan. The
impact of the holder-in-due-course rule becomes particularly perverse when
it prevents borrowers from defending foreclosure actions by assignees.
Ultimately, borrowers have no control over whether their loans are sold
or held by lenders in portfolio. As a matter of fairness, the law should not
prevent borrowers from obtaining complete relief from abusive loans,
especially because securitization creates added incentives toward predatory
lending.
194. See Donald R. Haurin & Stuart S. Rosenthal, The Growth Earnings of Low-Income
Households and the Sensitivity of Their Homeownership Choices to Economic and Socio-
Demographic Shocks 18 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham
Law Review), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/EarningsOfLow-
IncomeHouseholds.pdf (noting that when an adjustable rate mortgage adjusts upwards
following closing, each percentage point increase makes it thirty percent more likely that a
household will terminate homeownership and return to being renters).
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G. Subprime Borrowers Lack Effective Bargaining Power
The marketing techniques that subprime lenders and brokers employ
often impede borrowers' ability to comparison shop and bargain for loans.
The most abusive loans are targeted at unsophisticated people who believe
that their ability to borrow money is limited.195 This targeting, coupled
with high pressure tactics, such as promoting time-limited deals that require
borrowers to commit or lose the option to borrow at "special" rates, leads
borrowers to pay application fees immediately and commit to loans that
may not be in their best interests. Once the loan application process begins,
borrowers become psychologically committed to the loans and, depending
on the size of the application fee and the borrowers' liquid assets, may not
be able to afford to apply for another loan. 19 6
At the time of application, subprime lenders typically reveal only the
vaguest of terms to borrowers, waiting until closing to disclose the final
provisions. These last-minute changes in loan terms are problematic on
several fronts. First, borrowers are boundedly rational in the sense that they
are able to process some, but not all, loan terms. 197 Typically, they focus
on simple price terms, such as the monthly payment amount, and ignore
other potentially onerous terms, like prepayment penalties. 198 Lenders can
exploit these limits on borrowers' ability to absorb information to their
advantage. Second, when the final loan terms are presented to borrowers at
closing, essential terms are often obscured in the shuffle of complicated
loan papers. Many borrowers may believe that they are obligated to enter
the loan at closing even though the law permits them to walk away from the
closing or rescind the loan within three days of the closing. Others, who
may have experienced credit discrimination or who worry that their access
to credit is limited, may fear that they will lose access to future credit if they
reject proffered loans. 199 The secondary market benefits from the resulting
one-sided contracts and, therefore, should be responsible for some of the
damage these contract terms cause.
195. This targeting is often race-based. See Bocian, Ernst & Li, supra note 26, at 3-5;
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denial to Predatory Lending: The
Challenge of Sustaining Minority Homeownership 35-38 (2006) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Fordham Law Review) (discussing numerous studies on the link between
subprime lending and race); see also Complaint at 9, Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v.
Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp. (June 14, 2006), available at
http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press-releases/documents/2006/HUDComplaint.pdf.
196. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1283.
197. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "'Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex. L.
Rev. 1481, 1530 (2006).
198. Id. at 1539-40. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1225-44 (2003)
(describing how bounded rationality can lead to contract terms that favor sellers at the
expense of unwitting buyers).
199. Engel & McCoy, supra note 195, at 30-31.
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In sum, although securitization has enabled many people to obtain loans
who, in pre-securitization days, could not secure loans, it has also helped to
spawn predatory lending and has impeded the ability of borrowers to obtain
meaningful relief from abusive loans. These inequities, the other negative
externalities that predatory lending imposes on borrowers and cities, and the
unwillingness of the secondary market to police predatory lenders
effectively justify imposing liability on assignees.
VIII. AN ASSIGNEE LIABILITY PROPOSAL
In the nonconforming market, experience has shown that abusive loans
will continue to be securitized unless the law creates incentives to screen
out predatory loans. Furthermore, the time has come to hold the secondary
market responsible for policing lenders. Accordingly, we propose a system
of assignee liability that rewards entities that engage in due diligence
designed to detect loans with abusive terms. Our proposal would impose
extensive liability on assignees that failed to adopt the due diligence
standards we discuss below and would cap liability for those assignees that
complied with the specifications we outline.
A. Considerations When Designing a Due Diligence Standard for
Securitizing Residential Mortgage Loans
In formulating a due diligence standard for securitizing home loans,
several considerations must be kept in mind. First, any due diligence
standard should ideally contemplate individual loan review. Second, a
screening standard must be cost-effective. Any standard that is expensive
would counteract the goal of combating abusive lending by pushing up the
cost of home loans. Third, screening requires adoption of strong
nationwide standards making clear what constitutes a predatory term or
practice. Fourth, screening should only apply to abusive terms and
practices that are capable of detection on a cost-effective basis. As we
recognize, some types of mortgage fraud are not amenable to advance
screening. Finally, screening should be adaptable to the to-be-announced
and Rule 144A markets.
1. Cost-Effective Screening of Individual Loans
Ideally, due diligence should aspire to more than facial compliance. In
particular, it should check for actual compliance with anti-predatory lending
criteria by reviewing all individual loans in the loan pool. There are two
methods of verifying actual compliance: automated compliance and
manual inspection. Each method has its advantages and flaws.
Automated compliance systems have recently come to the fore. These
systems check every loan for compliance with state and local anti-predatory
laws, federal disclosure laws, and other criteria designated by the lender or
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investor.200 The advances in automated compliance followed the recent
spate of state anti-predatory lending laws.
Loan aggregators and investment banks use several different automated
compliance systems to screen tapes with data on individual loans.201
LendTech by ARC Systems, for example, provides individually tailored
automatic underwriting and due diligence systems to lenders, wholesalers,
investment bankers, and investors.202 LendTech allows lenders to "upload
credit and mortgage applications with a full credit file into the automated
model" in advance of warehousing or securitizing their loans. 20 3  A
competing product, ComplianceAnalyzer, is "a pre-close, automated,
transaction-level approach" to regulatory compliance. 204  The premier
version, known as ComplianceAnalyzer Plus, furnishes "lenders, investors,
and securitizers [with] comprehensive regulatory compliance auditing
(including 'high-cost' and 'anti-predatory' lending legislation). '20 5 The
manufacturer of the premier line, ComplianceEase, is so confident about its
ability to assure compliance that it offers "a comprehensive and flexible
warranty backed by an A.M. Best "A-" or better (Excellent) rated insurer.
Each loan can be covered up to $250,000 and the coverage is also easily
transferable to secondary market investors. '206  Other automated
compliance systems include InvestorServices by CoreLogic, High Cost
Analyzer by Clayton, 2Comply by Mavent, and Wiz Sentinel by PCi
Corporation.207 These automated compliance review programs can screen
loans for one dollar a loan and probably less. 20 8
200. Indeed, Fitch considers it "virtually impossible for originators of any meaningful
size to monitor compliance with predatory lending laws, as is required on a loan-level basis,
without the assistance of technology." FitchRatings, Can You See Me Now?, supra note
135.
201. See Erick Bergquist, Some Lenders Turning to Compliance Software, Am. Banker,
Apr. 1, 2003, at 12; Mary Dum, ARC Helps PCFS Get the Brass Ring, Mortgage Tech.,
Aug.-Sept. 2003, at 41; Anthony Garritano, Automating the LAW: Mavent Drills
Compliance Down to a Few Clicks, Mortgage Tech., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 30; see also Morse,
Not Exactly Prime, supra note 109. Since the late 1990s, S&P has required issuers to
provide S&P with data tapes containing loan level data with a variety of data fields,
including credit risk and credit scores. S&P uses the data tapes to assign risk grades to each
loan in a loan pool under its automated LEVELS credit scoring model. See, e.g., Raiter,
supra note 123, at 147.
202. See ARC Systems, Products & Services, http://www.arcsystems.com/products.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
203. Dum, supra note 201, at 41; see ARC Systems, LendTech Investor,
http://www.arcsystems.com/lt investormatrix.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
204. ComplianceEase, ComplianceAnalyzer@: Automated Compliance Solutions,
http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/prod/prod-ca-overview.jsp?content=/opencms/C
EContent/prod/prod caoverview..m.jsp&right-/opencms/CEContent/prod/rcritical_decisi
on.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
205. ComplianceEase, ComplianceAnalyzer® Plus with AssureCert® Protection,
http://www.compliancecase.com/mainsite/prod/prod-ac-overview.jsp?content-/opencms/C
EContent/prod/prod acoverview.m.j sp&right=-/opencms/CEContent/prod/rverify-assurec
ert.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
206. Id.
207. See Davis & Schloemer, supra note 184, at 8 tbl.2.
208. See id. at 6, 12 nn.21-24.
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Some major lenders have already adopted these systems in order to meet
legal compliance criteria that Fitch and S&P have imposed on residential
mortgage securitizations. 209  Secondary market adoption of automated
compliance puts pressure on brokers and lenders to adopt the same
safeguards. As one observer put it,
You know, the money controls the game.... [I]f an investor is using
tools.., then the broker or the originator will want to use that tool, too.
Not for any ethical reasons or not for any obligation to the investor or
anything. Because they want to close that loan, and they want to move
that loan. The only reason. Hey, whatever it takes.210
Automated compliance is not enough, however. "[L]oans may slip
through the cracks" of automated compliance if data is entered incorrectly
or too late for review or if the software does not apply the correct legal
test. 211 Accordingly, due diligence should augment automated systems
with manual inspections of loans and tests to confirm that the right legal
filters are in place.
In manual inspection, a compliance team makes an on-site inspection of
physical loan files and supporting documentation. One advantage of
manual inspection is that it can detect some types of loan fraud that
automated compliance cannot.212 However, manual inspection is time-
intensive, taking on average thirty to forty-five minutes per loan.213 While
manual inspection could be performed on every loan, normally it is limited
to a sample of loans due to cost concerns. 214 Although manual review costs
more than automated screening, it is not financially prohibitive, costing
about $43 per loan.215
209. See id. at 8 & tbl.2, 9. The GAO casts doubt on the effectiveness of automated
compliance systems on grounds that "data tapes used for loan reviews do not include point
and fee information." See GAO, supra note 109, at 79. Whether the GAO's assertion is true,
it is beside the point. While the data tapes that lenders provide to rating agencies vary in the
extent to which they contain fee information, automated compliance systems must and do
review points and fees to ascertain compliance with Truth in Lending Act disclosures and
high-cost statutes such as HOEPA and state equivalents that have points and fees triggers.
For example, ComplianceEase recalculates the annual percentage rate using the interest rate
and finance charges from the actual loan documents. See Press Release, ComplianceEase
Offers Predatory Lending Compliance Certification for Wall Street Rating Agencies (June
20, 2003), available at http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/about/news/cenews-
20030620_m.jsp.
210. See Roundtable, supra note 168, at 14.
211. See FitchRatings, supra note 200, at 2.
212. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
213. See Davis & Schloemer, supra note 184, at 6-7, 12 n.21.
214. When subprime RMBS underwriters do examine loan files manually, normally they
"don't do due diligence on every single loan in a pool; at most, they do a random sample of,
say, 3% of the loans." Shepherd, supra note 29, at 4.
215. See Davis & Schloemer, supra note 184, at 6 & n.2 1.
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2. Meaningful Screening Requires Adoption of Strict National
Anti-predatory Lending Standards
Automated compliance systems and manual due diligence are designed to
verify compliance with federal, state, and local consumer protection laws,
including anti-predatory lending laws. However, the current patchwork of
federal, state, and local laws leaves many lending abuses unregulated. 2
16
Further, the private-label secondary market does not screen out loans with
abusive features unless those abuses are unlawful.
Thus, for screening effectively to curtail predatory lending wherever it
occurs, it is necessary to adopt a strong set of anti-predatory lending
standards that apply to home loans throughout the country. Ideally such
standards would be adopted directly through federal legislation,217 but a
federal anti-predatory lending statute is not the only way to institute
standards with broad national effect. Other avenues might include a
uniform state law or a joint rulemaking by federal banking regulators and
the Federal Trade Commission declaring predatory practices illegal under
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Similarly, laws could specifically
prohibit rating agencies from rating loan pools that contain loans with
specified predatory terms or require the mortgage industry to adopt anti-
predatory lending standards that it would enforce through a self-regulatory
organization. However such standards are accomplished, effective
screening will not take place until nationwide standards are adopted.
3. Screening and Its Limitations
Screening cannot detect every predatory term or practice. Some types of
fraud will pass through automated filters and even manual inspection
without detection. 218  There are ways to uncover evidence of fraud,
however, some of which are automated. For instance, Fannie Mae's and
Freddie Mac's automated underwriting systems issue alerts when there are
216. Even in states with strong anti-predatory lending laws, the effect of those laws is
diluted by federal preemption rulings by federal banking regulators that exempt national
banks, federal savings associations, and their operating subsidiaries from such state laws.
See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 225 (2004).
217. For discussion of the contents of such a law, see Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at
1317-63, where we proposed a federal suitability standard for subprime mortgages. In
addition, HOEPA and its implementing regulations, the anti-predatory lending laws of a
number of states, including North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, the
screening criteria used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the regulations for Veterans
Administration loans provide an array of anti-predatory lending standards on which
screening standards could be modeled. Those standards include limitations on abusive
prepayment penalties, loan flipping schemes, asset-based lending, and balloon clauses. Id. at
1366-80.
218. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 109, at 79. For a cogent description of mortgage fraud
schemes, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Financial Crimes Report to the Public D1-D12 (May
2005).
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signs of an inflated appraisal, raising suspicions of property flipping or
appraisal fraud.2 19 Automation can also check for other types of fraud. A
borrower's identity can be confirmed through an online search. A database
maintained by Mortgage Asset Research Inc. lists past participants in
mortgage fraud.2 20 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) uses a "Neighborhood Watch" website to screen out originators who
have histories of making Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured
loans with high default rates. 22 1 CoreLogic issues a scorecard ranking
every mortgage broker and appraiser on the past quality of their loans.222
Automatic retrieval of records on loans by the same lender to the same
borrower can be instrumental in uncovering loan flipping. These automated
antifraud safeguards are powerful because they can be applied to every loan
in a loan pool.
A new insurance product partners fraud detection programs with fraud
insurance. 223 The Prieston Group (TPG) performs due diligence review of
lenders and certifies those that have adopted best practices. 224 TPG also
provides various services to assist lenders in preventing and detecting
fraud. 225 As part of the package, TPG provides fraud insurance that follows
loans when they are sold or securitized.22 6 Such products can protect
investors from the risk of fraud that may be difficult to detect. 227
Manual inspection can help detect other types of loan fraud. For
example, such inspection can detect whited-out information on loan
applications, a telltale sign of fraud. In inspections of no- or low-
documentation loan files, Fitch has discovered documents with income and
asset information blacked out. The inference is that the borrowers' income
or assets were too low to qualify for a conventional loan. Due to these and
similar fraud concerns, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
advises lenders to inspect manually a sample of their loan files, particularly
for loans that were sold by a broker or processed by inexperienced workers
or temporary employees. Manual checks can also be used to verify Social
Security numbers and assets and down payments. 2
28
219. See Erick Bergquist, Identifying Soft Spots in Fight Against Fraud, Am. Banker,
Sept. 27, 2004, at 7; Jody Shenn, Freddie Adds Suspicious-Valuation Alerts to LP, Am.
Banker, Oct. 22, 2004, at 7.
220. See Shenn, supra note 114, at 8m.
221. See Letter from HUD to All Approved Mortgagees, Enhancements to the
Neighborhood Watch Early Warning System, Mortgagee Letter 2002-15 (July 17, 2002),
available at http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/cgi/nph-brs.cgi?d=MLET&s 1 =02-
15[no]&SECTI=TXTHLB&SECT5=MLET&u=./hudclips.cgi&p = l& rnI&f- G
222. Roundtable, supra note 168, at 12.
223. See Jody Shenn, Fraud-Guard Venders Team Up, Am. Banker, Oct. 19, 2004, at 12.
224. The Prieston Group, Lenders, http://www.priestongroup.com/app/public/lenders.jsp
(last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The Prieston Group, TPG Mortgage Assurance Solution, available at
http://www.priestongroup.com/app/public/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
228. See Roundtable, supra note 168; Shenn, supra note 114, at 6a.
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When fraud slips undetected through due diligence, often it is possible
for trustees to detect it later through post-closing monitoring. In the closing
documents, lenders can be required to notify trustees of any complaints,
government investigations, or enforcement orders involving their lending
practices. Similarly, those contracts can give trustees the right to perform
spot audits of loans when red flags of lending abuse appear post-sale.
Screening can be difficult when anti-predatory lending standards are
vague. Examples include prohibitions on asset-based lending and
refinancings with no tangible net benefit to the borrower that do not provide
objective guidelines for determining compliance. Despite the difficulties
these types of standards present, rating agencies have devised ways of
rating loans from jurisdictions with imprecise lending standards.229 It is
also possible to devise objective measures to determine compliance with
vague standards. The Veterans Administration, for V.A. loans, uses two
quantitative tests-a debt-to-income ratio and a residual income test-to
guard against asset-based lending.230 Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board,
in the regulations implementing HOEPA, regulates loan flipping by
prohibiting a lender and any assignee from refinancing a HOEPA loan with
another HOEPA loan within one year from closing.231 Both of these
standards are objective and thus capable of detection through automated
compliance systems.
4. Tailoring Screening to the TBA and 144A Markets
The to-be-announced and Rule 144A markets present unique obstacles to
screening, but these obstacles are not insurmountable. Because these
markets do not contemplate presale screening, due diligence could take
place post-sale. In a TBA offering, the lender and/or the trustee can do
automated screening of loans immediately before loans are added to the
loan pool. Similarly, in a Rule 144A offering, screening could be
performed after the closing.
Nevertheless, screening poses a practical concern in both markets. In the
TBA market, post-closing review means that investors lack the leverage
they had before closing to walk away from the deal. When TBA offerings
are structured as public offerings, the lenders have to provide disclosures
and representations and warranties about the quality and legality of the loan
229. For example, S&P looks for factors mitigating aggressive enforcement of statutes,
such as laws limiting recovery to a pattern or practice of violations, scienter requirements, an
objective safe harbor, the litigation history of the law, or high proof or procedural hurdles to
recovery. S&P will require more credit enhancements absent such mitigating factors. See
S&P, supra note 135; see also Press Release, S&P, New Criteria Implemented for Including
Anti-Predatory Lending Law Lns in U.S. Rtd SF Trans (May 13, 2004) [hereinafter S&P,
New Criteria Implemented].
230. See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4337 (2006).
231. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2006). While the rule recognizes an exception for
refinancings that are "in the borrower's interest," essentially the one-year rule creates a
rebuttable presumption that refinancings within one year violate HOEPA. Id.
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pool. With those safeguards in hand, the trustee at least has the legal right
to reject substandard loans from the loan pool. The real issue, then, is the
transaction costs of enforcing those safeguards.
Matters are dicier in Rule 144A offerings. There, investors not only lack
the leverage to walk away, but do not benefit from any presale disclosures
or binding representations and warranties. Without those deal protections,
investors have no contractual guarantee of the minimum quality of loans to
be included in the loan pool. While Rule 144A investors and trustees could
insist, after-the-fact, that any illegal loans be removed from the loan pool,
their weak contract rights would undercut their bargaining position and
likely result in prolonged negotiations to no effect. As we discuss in the
next section, carefully tailored provisions imposing assignee liability for
predatory lending would arm Rule 144A and other investors with the
leverage they need to insist on adequate disclosures and binding
representations and warranties.
B. A Proposal for Assignee Liability in Residential Mortgage
Securitizations
1. Due Diligence
The time has come to adopt a national legal standard for due diligence in
residential mortgage securitizations and wholesale purchases of home loans.
We propose a due diligence standard with the following contours:
(i) Loan-Level Review for Actual Compliance: Due diligence should
include review of every loan in a loan pool for compliance with substantive
screening standards. Lenders and underwriters would have the choice of
manual or automated screening. Most lenders, particularly larger lenders,
would likely opt for automated screening. All residential loan pools would
be subject to loan-level review in full, whether those pools contain prime or
subprime loans.
(ii) Manual Screening for Other Signs of Fraud: Due diligence should
further require manual screening of a random sample of loan files for other
indicators of fraud. This review would be in addition to the automated or
manual review just described. Indicators of fraud could include the
whiting-out of critical underwriting information, inconsistent information,
and suspect or absent documentation. The random sample should be
sufficiently large to support statistical inferences within specified tolerances
about the absence or presence of the type of fraud tested for in the loan
pool.
(iii) Review for Facial Compliance: Before the advent of automated
screening, due diligence by underwriters and rating agencies traditionally
consisted of reviewing originators' loan products, sales and training
manuals, underwriting policies, broker selection, oversight, compensation
policies, and form loan contracts to verify compliance with consumer
protection and lending laws. Such due diligence continues to remain
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important. Indeed, in the Lehman Brothers case, FAMCO's scripted sales
materials allegedly coached FAMCO's loan officers on how to make
fraudulent sales pitches. 232 Accordingly, due diligence should retain review
for facial compliance. In addition, this phase should review all lawsuits
filed, other borrower complaints, and government investigations of or
actions taken against the lender for alleged predatory lending practices.
(iv) Determine Outcomes: A well-functioning due diligence system sets
benchmarks for how to respond to loans found to violate the screening
criteria. In the event of isolated violations, any loan that violated the
screening criteria would either have to be rejected from the loan pool or
have the defect promptly corrected. Higher volumes of violations would
require rejection of the entire loan pool and cancellation of the sale.233
(v) Adequate Representations and Warranties and Recourse Clauses
Enforceable by the Trust: In addition to ensuring screening, lenders should
be required to provide representations and warranties that all loans in the
loan pool comply with all applicable laws, including the nationwide
screening criteria. All representations and warranties should run to, and be
enforceable by, the trustee on behalf of the securitized trust. 234
(vi) Post-closing Monitoring: Due diligence should further require loan
originators, loan aggregators, underwriters, and servicers of residential
mortgage loan pools to provide written notice to the trustee of any borrower
complaints, lawsuits, subpoenas, notices of government investigations, and
enforcement orders involving any loans in the loan pool. In addition,
trustees should be required to investigate lenders whose loans prove to have
higher-than-average default, prepayment, and/or foreclosure rates than
loans with comparable risk.235
We recognize that these standards form the outer parameters for
workable due diligence and monitoring. Accordingly, we recommend that
232. Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 657-58 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2003) (findings of fact).
233. HUD has adopted this approach for Federal Housing Administration-insured loans.
See Letter from HUD to All Approved Mortgagees, Due Diligence in Acquiring Loans,
Mortgagee Letter 2002-21, at 5 (Sept. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/html/nph-brs.cgi?d=MLET&s I =02-$[no]&op 1 =AND
&SECT 1 =TXTHLB&SECT5=MLET&u = ../ htmI/ shortcut.htm&p =1 &r-7& f-G.
234. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Board already require
these contractual enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., Advisory Bull.
2005-AB-08 (Aug. 25, 2005), available at http://www.fhfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FilelD=4201;
Fannie Mae, Lender Letter No. 03-00, supra note 143; Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie
Mac Promotes Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy, supra
note 143; Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Will No Longer Invest in Subprime
Mortgages with Prepayment Penalty Terms Greater Than Three Years, supra note 143; cf
HUD, supra note 233, at 5-6 (noting that best practices involve such provisions).
235. Post-purchase monitoring can effectively detect unusual patterns among loan pools.
For example, in 2005, Freddie Mac observed unusually high prepayment rates on loans sold
by National City Mortgage. Eric Dash, Freddie Mac Purchased and Sold Faulty Loans, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 14, 2005, at C3. Elevated prepayment rates can be evidence that originators are
engaging in loan flipping. Id. Further investigation revealed that one broker was responsible
for the questionable loans. Id.
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a federal agency be empowered to work out the nuts-and-bolts details of
due diligence and monitoring through a rulemaking proceeding in which
consumer advocates, lenders, and secondary market participants provide
input into the types of controls that would best detect and deter predatory
lending. Furthermore, that agency should be empowered to update due
diligence and monitoring standards as circumstances and technology
evolve.
2. Assignee Liability
Our assignee liability proposal aims to achieve three objectives. First, it
would cause capital markets to internalize harm to borrowers from
financing abusive loans. Second, it would restore the full panoply of
remedies to borrowers that they had before their loans were securitized.
Finally, it would foster certainty by establishing bright-line rules enabling
assignees to estimate their potential liability for any predatory lending
claims.
a. Which Claims Would Be Subject to Assignee Liability?
Although borrowers can harness an array of claims against originators for
predatory lending, we propose extending assignee liability only to specific
causes of action. These causes of action are: (1) common law tort claims,
such as fraud and improvident lending; (2) contract claims such as
unconscionability; and (3) claims under state and local anti-predatory
lending laws. In addition, we would impose liability on assignees for
violations of a national suitability standard that we previously proposed. 236
This standard, which is akin to the suitability doctrine in securities
regulation, would prohibit originators from making unsuitable loans to
borrowers.
At this point, we do not propose altering or expanding assignee liability
under federal or state antidiscrimination, disclosure, or unfair and deceptive
trade practices laws. Doing so would require amending a multitude of
statutes. In addition, caution suggests that this foray into federal assignee
liability laws not be sweeping. After there has been time for adequate study
of the impact of our proposal, policymakers could consider harmonizing
assignee liability standards for discrimination, disclosure, and consumer
protection claims to reflect the expanding class of market participants who
should be liable under the statutes.
Finally, our proposal would operate as a floor, not a ceiling, and thus
would not preempt any stricter assignee liability provisions under state or
federal lending laws,237 such as HOEPA.
236. Engel & McCoy, supra note 13, at 1317-39.
237. See Azmy, supra note 70, at 390-404 (discussing how state lending laws provide
opportunities to assess the effect of various approaches to regulating lending practices).
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b. Remedies Available Against Assignees
Trusts that complied with the due diligence and monitoring standards
outlined above would be liable for the same declaratory and equitable relief
that borrowers could seek against their original lenders or brokers,
including rescission and reformation. Borrowers could also obtain
compensatory relief to the extent their damages were calculable. Thus, we
would permit recovery of relocation expenses, lost equity, excess fees,
interest payments, and late payment fees, but not recovery against assignees
for emotional distress. We would also permit prevailing borrowers to
recover attorneys' fees. Importantly, trusts that employed our due diligence
methods would not be subject to punitive damages or statutory penalties
that were punitive in nature. This limitation would apply even if the
underlying cause of action permitted punitive remedies against brokers or
lenders. Conversely, trusts that failed to check all due diligence criteria
would be liable for treble damages or other inflation-adjusted numeric
statutory penalties, whichever were greater. In no case could indeterminate
punitive damages or penalties be assessed against assignees.
Our liability proposal is subject to three provisos. First, assignees could
not escape liability by returning the abusive loan in question to the lender
under a recourse or other comparable clause and then raising the defense
that they no longer owned the loan.2 38 Second, borrowers would not need
to demonstrate a pattern or practice of weak controls across multiple
securitizations in order to assert a claim or defense against an assignee. Lax
due diligence in their own securitization would be enough to support treble
damages or a statutory penalty. Lastly, none of the limitations on the
claims that borrowers could assert against assignees or the relief to which
they would be entitled would apply to claims against brokers or lenders.
c. Comparison to Existing Assignee Liability Provisions
Assignee liability for predatory lending already exists on a limited scale.
The federal government, through HOEPA, and numerous states and cities
have adopted anti-predatory lending laws that contain assignee liability
provisions. Our proposal differs from these laws in several respects. We
contend our proposal offers a more effective approach to assignee liability.
First, our proposal would extend assignee liability to all abusive loans
nationwide, including loans that do not meet the HOEPA or state law
definitions of "high-cost" loans. Second, our proposal would enable rating
agencies to predict potential assignee liability and thus allay secondary
market concerns about indeterminate relief. Finally, our due diligence
provisions would impose the greatest liability on the assignees least willing
to police lenders.
238. The assignees could implead originators, however.
2090 [Vol. 75
TURNING A BLIND EYE
HOEPA and most state and local assignee liability laws apply only to so-
called "high-cost" loans that exceed specific interest rate or points and fees
triggers. HOEPA only applies to refinance loans 239 where the annual
percentage rate at origination exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of
comparable maturity plus eight percent on first-lien loans or where the total
points and fees exceed eight percent of the total loan amount or $547 (in
2007), whichever is greater. 240 Lenders who make HOEPA loans are
limited or precluded from making loans with balloon payments, prepayment
penalties, negative amortization, and other potentially onerous terms. 24 1
Assignees of HOEPA loans are liable for
all claims and defenses ... the consumer could assert against the creditor
of the mortgage, unless [the assignees] demonstrate, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a reasonable person exercising ordinary due
diligence, could not determine, based on the documentation required by
this [subchapter], the itemization of the amount financed, and other
disclosure of disbursements that the mortgage [was a HOEPA loan].242
Many state and local anti-predatory lending statutes and ordinances track
HOEPA's structure. Some have adopted HOEPA's triggers. 243 Most other
state and local laws have modified the criteria for covered loans, including
lower triggers,244 broader definitions of the fees trigger,24 5 and imposing
maximum loan amounts in the definition of high-cost loans.246 Many have
also enlarged the list of prohibited practices for "covered" loans.247
Just as the triggers and other provisions in state and local anti-predatory
lending laws take a range of approaches, so do state assignee liability laws.
Some states insulate assignees from all liability for abusive loans. Among
states that do permit assignee liability, most impose liability only for "high-
cost" loans, as defined by statute. The conditions under which assignees
may be liable for abusive lending and the remedies available against them
vary widely. Some laws exempt assignees from liability if they engage in
due diligence to keep "high-cost" loans out of loan pools. Others only cap
the liability of assignees who engage in due diligence. Depending on the
jurisdiction, assignees who fail to meet the laws' due diligence standards
may face very limited damages or indeterminate punitive sanctions and
damages awards. Still other jurisdictions have no due diligence standard
and restrict the scope of assignee liability. Finally, a couple of cities have
239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(2) (2006).
240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa)(1)-(aa)(4); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(a)(1), (b)(1); Truth in
Lending, 71 Fed. Reg. 46388 (2006). See generally Eugene J. Kelley et al., An Overview of
HOEPA, Old and New, 59 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 203 (2005).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
242. Id. § 1641(d)(1).
243. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 9-A, § 8-103(1)(F-1) (1997).
244. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-21A-3(H), (L) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
245. See, e.g., 815 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 137/10 (West Supp. 2006).
246. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-103(5)(A) (Supp. 2005).
247. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 360.100(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
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passed ordinances that imposed strict liability on assignees with no safe
harbors or limitations on available remedies.
California's Financial Code explicitly exempts assignees from any claims
arising under its law restricting abusive loan terms so long as they are
holders in due course or "chartered by Congress to engage in secondary
mortgage market transactions." 248 In contrast, Georgia provides assignees
with a safe harbor for reasonable due diligence. Under its state anti-
predatory lending statute, borrowers with "high-cost" loans can bring any
claims and raise any defenses against assignees that they could raise against
loan originators,
unless the purchaser or holder demonstrates, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the purchaser or holder exercised reasonable due diligence
at the time of purchase of the home loans, or within a reasonable time
thereafter, intended to prevent the purchaser or holder from purchasing or
taking assignment of high-cost home loans.249
Conversely, if assignees fail to engage in the prescribed due diligence,
borrowers can obtain equitable relief, the balance of the amount due on
their loan, and reasonable attorneys' fees.2 50
Another approach is to allow limited assignee liability even when
assignees engage in due diligence. This is the approach New Jersey took in
its Home Ownership Security Act. The law insulates assignees from almost
all liability for "high-cost" loans if they meet due diligence requirements
designed to screen out "high-cost" loans. 251  The law does, however,
provide two exceptions. The first permits borrowers to assert claims
against all assignees, even those that engage in due diligence, for violations
of the Home Ownership Security Act for the amount "required to reduce or
extinguish the borrower's liability under the home loan plus amounts
required to recover costs including reasonable attorney's fees. ' 252 Second,
borrowers can raise any defense, claim, or counterclaim against assignees
at any time during the term of a high-cost home loan after an action to
collect on the home loan or foreclose on the collateral securing the home
248. Cal. Fin. Code § 4979.8 (West Supp. 2007).
249. Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6(b) (2004); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-
105(a)(2)(A)(ii); D.C. Code § 26-1153.05(a) (2005); 815 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann.
137/135(d)(1). Taking a different tack, in Kentucky, assignee liability applies only if "the
violation for which the action or proceeding is brought is apparent on the face of the
disclosure or the underlying promissory note." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 360.100(1)(b); see also
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598D.050, 598D. 110.2 (2004) (holding assignees liable if they "willfully
engage[d] in any unfair lending practice described in this chapter in connection with a home
loan").
250. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6(c). Other jurisdictions similarly limit the relief
available against assignees. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 26-1153.05; 815 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann.
137/135(d); Ark. Code Ann. § 23-53-105(a)(2)(A)(ii).
251. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-27(b) (West Supp. 2006). Other states have enacted similar
statutory schemes. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-21A-1 I(A); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, §
15 (Supp. 2006).
252. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:1OB-27(c).
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loan has been initiated or the debt arising from the home loan has been
accelerated or the home loan has become 60 days in default.253
Again, borrowers' recovery is limited to the "amounts required to reduce or
extinguish the borrower's liability" and attorneys' fees.2 54 Assignees who
do not satisfy New Jersey's due diligence requirements are liable for the full
range of claims and defenses which borrowers could assert against loan
originators. 255
New York does not require due diligence to screen for high-cost loans.
Rather, it imposes assignee liability in limited situations and restricts the
relief to which borrowers are entitled. Borrowers can "assert any claims in
recoupment and defenses to payment" arising under the state's high-cost
home loan law "that the borrower could assert against the original
lender." 256 This provision only applies to an "action by an assignee to
enforce a loan against a borrower in default more than sixty days or in
foreclosure." 2 57
The cities of Los Angeles and Oakland attempted to paint assignee
liability with a broad brush by passing ordinances holding assignees liable
for any claims arising from high-cost loans that could be asserted against
loan originators. 258 The ordinances had no due diligence or other safe
harbor provisions and no limits on the liability to which assignees could be
exposed. The California Supreme Court has held that state law preempts
these ordinances. 259
While each of these approaches has laudable features, they all suffer from
infirmities. First, it is too easy for lenders to write loans beneath the
triggers for high-cost loans and thus evade the reach of anti-predatory
lending laws. A recent nationwide study of state anti-predatory lending
laws, which found evidence that mortgage lenders had switched from fixed-
rate to adjustable-rate loans following passage of those laws, suggests that
lenders are attempting such evasion. 260 As part of the switch to adjustable-
rate products, the recent spate of interest-only and option adjustable-rate
mortgages made without regard for the borrowers' ability to repay so
253. Id. § 46:10B-27(c)(2).
254. Id. § 46: 1OB-27(c). Similarly, Arkansas allows claims against assignees who engage
in due diligence, but only in the form of offset actions in default or foreclosure actions. Ark.
Code Ann. § 23-53-105.
255. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-27(b); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 15(a)
(authorizing unrestricted liability on assignees who do not adhere to state's due diligence
requirements); Ind. Code Ann. § 24-9-5-1 (LexisNexis 2006) (same).
256. N.Y. Banking Law § 6-1(13) (McKinney Supp. 2007).
257. Id.
258. Oakland, Cal. Code, ch. 5.33.070 (2006); Los Angeles, Cal. Municipal Code, art. 1,
§ 162.07.
259. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005).
260. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost
of Credit 21-23, 26 (Research Div., Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No.
2006-022A, 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-022.pdf.
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alarmed federal banking regulators in 2006 that they issued a guidance
curbing abusive practices in nontraditional mortgages. 261
There are also signs that predatory lending is starting to infiltrate the
prime market. For instance, the number of foreclosure starts for prime
loans in Chicago in 2005 exceeded the number of foreclosure starts that
year for subprime and high-cost loans combined.262 This suggests that
predatory lending laws should not focus solely on high-cost loans.
Second, when laws fully immunize assignees who engage in due
diligence from liability, they reap the benefits of the pricing distortions and
market imperfections that permeate the subprime market. In contrast, laws
like New Jersey's that impose limited liability on assignees who engage in
due diligence force assignees to internalize some costs that affected
borrowers would otherwise bear.
Our third concern goes to appropriate relief against assignees who do not
perform due diligence. Current remedies range from very limited relief to
unbounded compensatory and punitive damages. The former provides
insufficient incentives to police lenders. The latter are so indeterminate that
rating agencies cannot estimate potential assignee liability and therefore the
needed level of credit enhancements.2 63
The laws that do not have due diligence safe harbors have their own
limitations. The law should treat assignees who engage in due diligence
more favorably. This satisfies notions of fairness and forces the worst
actors to absorb the most costs.
Our proposal solves the problems presented by existing legislation by (1)
eliminating triggers for assignee liability for abusive loans; (2) having clear
standards that make it possible for assignees to predict the potential bases
for and extent of liability; (3) requiring all assignees to internalize some of
the costs that securitization imposes on borrowers; (4) making the extent of
assignee liability depend on adequately screening loans; and (5) providing
quantifiable damages that will enable rating agencies to evaluate the risks
associated with loan pools.
IX. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS
Due diligence standards and assignee liability are controversial
propositions in the residential mortgage market. In this section, we respond
to criticisms of such proposals.
261. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg.
58609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
262. David C. Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2006, at 6, 8 (2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at http://www.ntic-
us.org/documents/ChicagoForeclosureUpdate2006-revised-000.pdf.
263. See S&P, Standard & Poor's Addresses New Jersey Predatory Lending Law (May 2,
2003).
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A. Our Due Diligence Proposal Does Not Espouse Radical Changes to the
Secondary Market
In all modesty, there is nothing new about our due diligence standards.
To the contrary, two of the most important purchasers in the conventional
secondary mortgage market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have adopted
similar standards. Both government-sponsored entities (GSEs) already
require lenders who sell them loans to screen out loans with specified
predatory features, regardless of the interest rates on those loans or whether
the predatory features are legal. 264 The market coverage of such due
diligence is impressive: The two GSEs together purchase a large portion of
subprime home loans, amounting to 43.7 percent of total subprime
securitized issues in 2004.265
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made their
first forays into subprime territory, buying the best, A- subprime loans. In
April 2000, as predatory lending concerns began to mount, Fannie Mae
issued guidelines to sellers of loans mandating screening criteria to protect
Fannie Mae from buying predatory loans. Those guidelines require lenders
to use Fannie Mae's automated underwriting program to avoid steering of
prime-eligible customers to high-priced loans, prohibit loans made without
regard to the borrower's ability to pay, and limit points and fees to five
percent of principal. 266 Freddie Mac issued comparable guidelines to
sellers and servicers in December 2000.267 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
are reputedly aggressive in rejecting predatory loans and in requiring
lenders to repurchase such loans if later evidence of predatory lending crops
up.
The two GSEs are not the only federal entities that require review of
purchased loans. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
stipulates that national banks that buy home loans require intermediaries
and originators to conduct proper due diligence to avoid purchasing
predatory loans.268 Similarly, HUD has adopted best practices guidelines
264. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 109, at 79-81; supra note 143. HUD regulations can or
do deny credit to the GSEs toward their affordable housing goals for HOEPA loans and
mortgages that are "contrary to good lending practices," contain "unacceptable terms or
conditions," or "result[] from unacceptable practices." 24 C.F.R. §§ 81.2, 81.16(c)(12)-
(c)(13) (2005). Impermissible loans include loans where lenders fail to report repayments by
borrowers to credit agencies, asset-based loans, and loans involving steering, excessive fees,
abusive prepayment penalties, or prepaid single-premium credit life insurance. Id.; see also
Regulatory Amendments to Strengthen Prevention of Predatory Lending Practices, 71 Fed.
Reg. 33144 (June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 81); Prohibition of Property
Flipping in HUD's Single Family Mortgage Insurance Programs, 71 Fed. Reg. 33138 (June
7, 2006) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 115) (applying property flipping restrictions to the
GSEs).
265. See S&P, supra note 175, at 2.
266. See Fannie Mae, Lender Letter No. 03-00, supra note 143.
267. See Letter from Freddie Mac to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, Freddie
Mac's Stance Against Predatory Lending Practices, supra note 143.
268. The OCC requires such guidelines by national banks to impose minimum
underwriting requirements, appraisal criteria, and standards on total interest and fees,
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governing due diligence in the purchase and servicing of loans insured by
the FHA.269 In the most recent example of this trend, in 2005, the Federal
Housing Finance Board instructed the Federal Home Loan Banks to adopt
uniform anti-predatory lending guidelines for purchases of mortgages by
Federal Home Loan Bank members. 270
Already, substantial portions of the secondary market are subject to due
diligence or are encouraged by federal regulators to adopt best practices.
Nevertheless, much of the private-label resale market continues to escape
those guidelines. As a result, numerous predatory loans still slip into
securitizations.
B. Our Proposal Will Not Drive Out Legitimate Credit
Assignee liability proposals for residential mortgages often face
opposition on grounds that they will cause a retraction in available credit to
underserved borrowers. This criticism is susceptible to testing. Over the
last few years, numerous states have passed anti-predatory lending laws.271
Two noteworthy empirical studies with nationwide scope have assessed the
impact of specific state laws on the volume of subprime credit.
Economists Giang Ho and Anthony Pennington-Cross have analyzed the
impact of state and local anti-predatory lending laws on subprime
lending.272 They found that "predatory lending laws have only a modest
impact on the cost of credit. ''273 In addition, they concluded that "the
including provisions on "maximum rates, points, and other charges, and the use of overages
and yield-spread premiums, structured to avoid providing an incentive to originate loans
with predatory or abusive characteristics." See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. C.III.E.3 (2006); see
also OCC, Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased
Loans, Advisory Letter 2003-3 (Feb. 21, 2003).
269. The HUD guidelines recommend loan-level review designed to reject loans
involving property flips, appraisal frauds, excessive points and fees, and credit extensions
without regard to the borrower's ability to pay. See HUD, supra note 233.
270. In drafting uniform guidelines, the Banks are to consult similar guidelines of the
GSEs, HUD, federal regulators, and large financial institutions. In addition to barring
purchase of illegal loans, the guidelines must address the purchase of HOEPA loans and
loans with certain predatory features, such as prepaid single premium credit life insurance,
prepayment penalties with extended terms, and mandatory arbitration clauses. See Fed.
Hous. Fin. Bd., supra note 234.
271. See generally S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update (Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update]; S&P, supra note 135; S&P, Evaluating
Predatory Lending Laws: Standard & Poor's Explains its Approach (Apr. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter S&P, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws]; Azmy, supra note 70, at 371-76.
272. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory
Lending Laws on the Flow of Subprime Credit 50 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working
Paper No. 2006-009A, Feb. 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-
009.pdf.
273. See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost
of Credit 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No 2006-022A, 2006),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-022.pdf. In a press release dated
February 1, 2005, S&P announced that it had completed a study showing that the capital
markets financed only $87 million in high-cost loans in 2004 and surmised that anti-
predatory lending legislation had limited either the origination or securitization of such
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typical law has little impact on the flow of subprime credit as measured by
loan origination and application." 274 In fact, state anti-predatory lending
laws with lower triggers (and thus broader coverage) resulted in increased
loan originations and applications. In their opinion, broader anti-predatory
lending laws may alleviate consumers' concerns that they could fall prey to
predatory lending and make them more confident about applying for
subprime mortgage loans. "In other words," they observed, "the demand
for subprime credit can actually increase when a predatory lending law is
enacted." 275
A second study by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) of
securitized subprime loans reported comparable findings.276 The study
compared subprime loan volumes in twenty-eight states with anti-predatory
lending laws to volumes in states with no such laws (designated the control
states), after controlling for time effects plus economic and demographic
variables. When the latter variables were held constant, twenty of the
twenty-eight states experienced no change in volume, six had higher
volumes, and two had lower volumes, relative to the control states.
Furthermore, Georgia--one of the two states with reduced volumes-
experienced an increase in subprime loans without prohibited loan terms.277
Finally, the CRL study found that nominal subprime interest rates remained
the same or dropped in almost all states with anti-predatory lending laws,
compared with the control states. 278
Experience under the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule abolishing
the holder-in-due-course rule for consumer loans, including home loans
used to finance goods and services, also suggests that fears of a credit
drought are overstated. 279 When the FTC promulgated its rule in 1976,
loans. However, S&P did not provide comparative data for prior years and has not made the
study publicly available. See Press Release, S&P, Study Shows Capital Markets Not
Financing High Cost U.S. Mortgage Loan Originations (Feb. 1, 2005). A separate study,
commissioned by the National Home Equity Mortgage Association (NHENA) and the
National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB), found that New Jersey lenders planned
to cut their subprime cash-out refinance and home improvement lending by sixty-nine
percent after passage of New Jersey's assignee liability law. See Richard F. DeMong, The
Impact of the New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, at 5 (Mar. 26, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review), available at
http://www.mbaa.org/images/namb/documents/PDF/2004 03-26-_nj-results.pdf. The
NHEMA/NAMB study, however, was based solely on self-reports by lenders and brokers,
and its quantitative estimates were calculated before New Jersey amended its law to soften
its provisions. Other scholars have pointed out that a drop in lending volumes does not
necessarily harm social welfare, and in fact enhances it when the reduction is mostly limited
to predatory loans. See Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis,
Assessing the Impact of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 15 Housing Pol'y Debate
573 (2004).
274. Ho & Pennington-Cross, supra note 273, at 47.
275. Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory Lending
Laws on the Flow of Subprime Credit, 60 J. Urb. Econ. 210, 226 (2006).
276. Li & Ernst, supra note 92.
277. See id. at 13-14.
278. See id. at 15-17.
279. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2005).
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lenders predicted dire effects on the availability of consumer credit. Time
proved them wrong. Instead, "suppliers of consumer goods and credit, at
least the honest ones ... accommodated themselves easily to the FTC
[rule], with only a slight drop in the amount of consumer credit
available." 280
Finally, there is compelling anecdotal evidence that state anti-predatory
lending laws have not had an adverse impact on the flow of subprime
credit. After surveying lenders in states with anti-predatory lending laws,
including those with assignee liability provisions, Morgan Stanley issued a
report in 2002 stating,
We recently conducted a "channel check" among branch managers of
several major consumer-finance lenders. We expected to hear that new
predatory lending laws were crimping growth and driving capacity out of
the margin. Our thinking was that volume might slow, but that improving
margins would offer a partial offset. Instead, we discovered that, at least
according to the 280 branch managers with whom we conducted detailed
telephonic surveys, new laws, and the changes in lending practices that
have resulted, are not hurting growth. On the contrary, we heard from a
number of branch managers that the changes they have made to comply
with the new lending laws may have increased origination volume, as
potential customers feel more at ease with the loan process....
. . . Even the toughest new laws, in states like North Carolina, for
example, do not seem to be affecting branch volumes.281
C. Rating Agencies Do Rate Loans Subject to Damages Caps for Assignee
Liability
Some critics have claimed that rating agencies cannot and will not rate
subprime loans originated in states with assignee liability provisions. The
reality belies this claim. Rating agencies are rating subprime issues from
most states with assignee liability laws.282 Their willingness to rate issues
280. Eggert, supra note 116, at 429 n.305 (citing William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan,
The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due Course Doctrine on the Commercialization of
Innovative Consumer Products, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 325, 338 & n.51 (1984)) (describing how
the Wharton Forecasting Institute estimated that only a 5.5% reduction in the volume of
consumer credit in 1976 was caused by the FTC's rule); see also White & Summers, supra
note 72, at 508 ("It now appears that [arguments that the holder-in-due-course rule was
essential to the free flow of credit] were incorrect"; abolition of the rule for certain consumer
transactions "caused barely a ripple on the consumer credit pond").
281. Morgan Stanley, Channel Check: Surprisingly Strong Subprime Growth 2-3 (Aug.
1, 2002), available at http://butera-andrews.com/legislative-
updates/directory/Media/other/MS-SubPrime.pdf.
282. See, e.g., S&P, supra note 135; S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update, supra
note 271; S&P, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 271. For a discussion of the
application of the credit enhancement criteria, see infra notes 283-301 and accompanying
text.
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from these states typically hinges on whether assignees' potential damages
can be quantified. In this regard, S&P has stated, "Standard & Poor's
believes that when the risk associated with violating an anti-predatory
lending law is quantifiable, then Standard & Poor's will allow loans
governed by that law in its rated transactions if the risk is supported by the
appropriate credit enhancement. '283
S&P has been able to quantify the following elements of damages:
unpaid loan balance, principal, interest, and fees paid to date, double or
treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. In addition, S&P is able to
quantify the cost of loan rescission.284
In a handful of controversial situations, S&P has refused to rate high-cost
loans in states that enacted assignee liability laws with indeterminate
damages provisions. 285 The most celebrated instance was in Georgia,
which passed a strict assignee liability law in 2002. Thereupon, S&P
announced it would refuse to rate all Georgia home loans subject to the law,
after which the Georgia legislature amended the law to cap damages on
high-cost loans. 286 With passage of the amendment, S&P agreed to "review
transactions that propose to include [Georgia] high-cost loans on a case-by-
case basis."287
Currently, S&P refuses to rate loan pools containing high-cost loans
governed by assignee liability laws in Indiana, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey on grounds that those laws create indeterminate damages exposure
and thus do not permit S&P to calculate the maximum exposure per loan for
securitized trusts.288 Our assignee liability proposal, unlike the Indiana,
283. S&P, supra note 135. Because S&P has taken the lead in developing ratings
methods for high-cost loans from states with assignee liability, this discussion focuses on
S&P's approach.
284. See S&P, Standard & Poor's Implements Credit Enhancement Criteria and Revises
Representation and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-Predatory Lending Law Loans in
U.S. Rated Structured Finance Transactions (May 13, 2004).
285. See generally Azmy, supra note 70, at 374-76; David Reiss, Subprime
Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 985 (2006).
286. See Azmy, supra note 70, at 374-76; Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor's to
Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans (Jan. 16, 2003). Compare Georgia Fair Lending
Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (West 2002), with Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6 (West
2004).
287. Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor's Will Admit Georgia Mortgage Loans into
Rated Structured Finance Transactions (Mar. 11, 2003).
288. In certain cases, S&P will rate high-cost loans from Massachusetts originated by
national banks, federal savings associations, and federal savings banks that enjoy federal
preemption. See, e.g., S&P, Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update, supra note 271; see also
S&P, Standard & Poor's Addresses Indiana Anti-Predatory Lending Law (Oct. 18, 2004);
S&P, Standard & Poor's Addresses Massachusetts' Predatory Home Loan Practices Act
(Sept. 20, 2004); S&P, New Criteria Implemented, supra note 229; S&P, supra note 284;
S&P, supra note 263; Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor's Eliminates Additional Credit
Enhancement Requirements for Indiana Home Loans (Feb. 7, 2005) (excluding, however,
Indiana high-cost loans); Press Release, S&P, Standard & Poor's Permits Additional New
Jersey Mortgage Loans Into Rated SF Transactions (Nov. 25, 2003).
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Massachusetts, and New Jersey statutes, is limited to quantifiable exposure
and thus is amenable to rating.
D. Our Proposal Will Not Make Legitimate Loans Unaffordable
Critics of assignee liability also contend that proposals such as ours will
render home loans uneconomical. As we have demonstrated, the cost of
due diligence is minimal, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the
overall cost of originating a home loan. The more significant cost
consideration arises from the possibility that rating agencies might require
additional credit enhancements in response to the increased liability
exposure of trusts. If they were large enough, credit enhancements could
push up the price of loans. As it turns out, there is scant evidence that S&P
has required significant added credit enhancements in response to laws
imposing assignee liability so long as there is an adequately capitalized
lender, a well-crafted assignee liability law, and effective due diligence
review.
S&P officially takes the position that high-cost loans originated in states
with quantifiable assignee liability laws require added credit
enhancements. 289  S&P, however, keeps the exact amount of credit
enhancements required a mystery.290 Repeatedly, in public statements,
S&P has trotted out estimates of the maximum legal exposure per loan
(which S&P terms "loss severities"). These loss severities vary by state and
go as high as 275 percent of the original loan balance for "high-cost loans"
that are originated in North Carolina and Kentucky.291  Obviously, if
289. S&P states that it requires elevated credit enhancements or their equivalent for
certain high-cost or covered loans originated in Arkansas, Colorado, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. The same is true for home loans originated in Cleveland
Heights and Toledo, Ohio, and HOEPA loans. See S&P, supra note 284.
290. See Erick Bergquist, Predator Laws: S&P's Awkward Position, Am. Banker, May
18, 2004, at 1 ("S&P couches risk warnings on various loan types under the term of potential
'loss severity'-even in jurisdictions and categories where S&P says it would not require
credit enhancements-but does not specify the actual credit enhancement requirement.").
291. See Susan Barnes, Managing Dir., S&P & Scott Mason, Dir., S&P, 14-16 (May 17,
2004) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation, on file with the Fordham Law Review); Susan
Barnes, Managing Dir., S&P, Evaluating Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: S&P's Approach 4
(Apr. 19, 2004) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation, on file with the Fordham Law
Review); see also S&P, supra note 135; S&P, supra note 284. For jurisdictions with
assignee liability laws, S&P has estimated loss severities ranging from 37 percent of the
original loan balance in Ohio to 275 percent in North Carolina and Kentucky (both of which
permit forfeiture of interest charges plus twice the interest paid, attorneys' fees and costs).
See S&P, supra note 284. An S&P managing director explained how S&P would arrive at a
268 percent loss severity for a 30-year fixed-rate home loan for $100,000 at 9.00 percent
annual interest under a proposed Nevada law to impose treble damages liability on assignees
(assuming that damage to the borrower would consist of all interest paid over the life of the
loan):
- Conservatively assume that average life of a mortgage is 10 years
- Total interest paid on loan over 10 years is $85,984
- Assume 10% of the [unpaid principal balance] ($10,000 in this example)
as attorney fees and costs
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lenders had to provide credit enhancements equaling 275 percent of the loan
principal, subprime securitization would come to a halt.
Despite these predictions, subprime securitization keeps growing, which
suggests that loss severity risks are not hampering the securitization
market.292 Indeed, "S&P insists that loss severity numbers by themselves
do not say much. '293 Rather, it appears that even where S&P projects high
loss severities, the company does not recommend correspondingly high
credit enhancements. For example, in a talk before industry representatives,
S&P presented a worst-case projection suggesting that for a pool with five
percent of high-cost loans originated in an assignee liability state with a loss
severity level of 196 percent, the required credit enhancements for the AAA
tranche would rise at most by eighteen percent.294 The assumption that five
percent of loans in a pool are high-cost is likely excessive, thus inflating
S&P's calculation of the level of needed credit enhancements. S&P's own
estimates suggest that the average proportion of high-cost loans in any one
loan pool may be well under five percent. 295
Even if S&P applied its formula ruthlessly, the required credit
enhancements would exceed (and often far exceed) the actual risk involved.
S&P's formula assumes that every loan in default (plus twenty-five percent
of performing loans) will be successfully litigated and result in maximum
legal exposure. As any experienced litigator knows, that is virtually never
the case. Indeed, state anti-predatory laws have deterred lenders from
- $85,984 * 3 = $257,952
- $257,952 + $10,000 = $267,952 or 268% of original loan balance
See Barnes, supra, at 18.
292. See David Glehan, Dir., S&P, The Subprime Market 7 (June 10, 2005) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation), available at http://events.mortgagebankers.org/nonprime2005/
signatureconferences/nonprime/images/img/TheSubprimeMarket.pdf.
293. See Bergquist, supra note 290, at 9.
294. See Barnes & Mason, supra note 291, at 16. The example used was Arkansas H.B.
2598, which authorizes damages in the amount needed to extinguish the borrower's liability
under the loan, plus the total principal, interest, and fees already paid, plus attorneys' fees
and costs. See id. at 14. Nominally, S&P calculates added credit enhancements as follows.
S&P separately calculates the exposure from defensive claims (claims raised in defense to
collection or foreclosure) and affirmative claims under state anti-predatory lending laws and
adds them together. For each type of claim, the agency uses the following principle to
calculate the required credit enhancement:
FF x LS = CER
The foreclosure frequency (FF) is the probability of foreclosure and is assumed to include all
loans in default. (On top of the foreclosure frequency, S&P also assumes that one-quarter of
subprime loans not in default will result in affirmative claims by borrowers). The loss
severity (LS) usually equals the maximum damages exposure in a particular jurisdiction.
The required credit enhancement (CER) is then discounted by the percentage of high-cost
loans in the loan pool. S&P uses this methodology to price both potential individual claims
and class action liability (where the class size can be determined). See id. at 14-16; see also
S&P, supra note 135; S&P, supra note 284; Barnes, supra note 291, at 4.
295. S&P has determined that only one-one-hundredth of one percent (0.01%) of U.S.
home loans that it rated in 2004 were high-cost loans. See S&P, supra note 273; cf S&P,
New Criteria Implemented, supra note 229 (noting that the proportion was low).
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making unlawful high-cost loans. 296  Nonetheless, S&P's formula
automatically "defaults to the remedy that reflects the worst-case scenario,"
thereby inflating its credit enhancement projections. 297 Perhaps this is why
S&P says that "[a]s performance and loss information for the loans subject
to additional credit enhancement develops, Standard & Poor's will adjust its
criteria as appropriate." 298
In reality, S&P rarely requires the credit enhancements it claims are
necessary. While S&P's pronouncements on the subject have been
inconsistent, its statements reveal wide-scale waiver of the official credit
enhancement requirement. Thus, in 2004, S&P officials said that added
credit enhancements will be required only for loans from states with
assignee liability laws that contain subjective standards and where no
mitigating factors otherwise exist.299 Elsewhere, an S&P managing director
assured lenders that for loan pools that have undergone satisfactory
compliance review, where S&P considers the lender creditworthy, and
where the lender reports which loans are governed by an assignee liability
law, on "a case by case basis, S&P will allow the loans into a transaction
and will track them through its TRENDS Database." 300  S&P will also
waive added credit enhancements where the lender provides representations
and warranties that the loan pool does not contain high-cost loans.
In sum, for creditworthy lenders, S&P has sufficient confidence in
automated compliance 30 1 to allow high-cost loans into loan pools, subject to
tracking, without the need for significant added credit enhancements. This
suggests that the cost of assignee liability in terms of added credit
enhancements under our proposal would be relatively low. Combined with
the low cost of due diligence and the large anticipated welfare effects to
consumers and society from eliminating lending abuses, 302 assignee
liability would improve, not destroy, credit for underserved borrowers.
296. See Li & Ernst, supra note 92, at 11-12; Quercia, Stegman & Davis, supra note 273,
at 593-97.
297. See S&P, supra note 284.
298. See S&P, New Criteria Implemented, supra note 229.
299. See Barnes & Mason, supra note 291, at 2. Mitigating factors that can reduce or
eliminate the need for added credit enhancements include (1) damages arising only from a
pattern or practice of violations; (2) liability only for knowing and/or intentional violations;
(3) objective standards; (4) little or no litigation history; (5) rebuttable presumptions; (6)
cure periods; (7) restrictions on affirmative or defensive claims; and (8) statutes of
limitation. See id. at 6.
300. Barnes, supra note 291, at 19.
301. In a related context, Fitch stated that experience had demonstrated the accuracy and
reliability of automated compliance systems:
Based on results of the transaction loan sampling over the past 22 months, Fitch
has determined that there has been excellent compliance with Fitch's high cost
loan criteria. Furthermore, compliance systems have become a critical component
of the underwriting and quality control process, and the investment in these
systems and the reliance on them has grown accordingly.
FitchRatings, Fitch Revises RMBS Guidelines, supra note 135.
302. Robert Quercia and his co-authors made this point eloquently in a 2004 study of the
North Carolina anti-predatory lending law, in which they demonstrated that almost ninety
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E. Our Proposal Could Help Solve Adverse Selection Problems that Harm
Securitizers, Lenders, and Borrowers
Our assignee liability proposal could also help to solve the adverse
selection problem caused by securitization, which could reduce the level of
credit enhancements needed and the cost of credit to borrowers. As we
have discussed throughout this Article, absent due diligence, "lemon loans"
can escape detection during the securitization process. Effective due
diligence creates disincentives to adverse selection by lenders, and thus will
deter the worst abuses. This will help reduce the credit risk that arises from
information asymmetries between lenders and the secondary market and
reduce needed credit enhancements. Ultimately, borrowers could benefit
from these savings and pay less for their loans.
Similarly, reports of abusive lending may have led potential borrowers,
who would be desirable to lenders and the secondary market, to shy away
from taking out loans. To the extent that these borrowers believe that
powerful anti-predatory lending laws will protect them, the laws may solve
another adverse selection problem, which is that reports of predatory
lending have driven "good" borrowers from the marketplace.
CONCLUSION
In a 2004 report to Congress, GAO expressed optimism that market
discipline by investors in subprime mortgage-backed securities would help
drive out predatory lending. 30 3 That optimism was misplaced. Predatory
loans continue to be financed by the capital markets. Furthermore,
experience has shown that the private-label secondary market will generally
only screen out abusive loans when required to do so by law.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development put it well when it
said in the context of FHA-insured loans,
Effective due diligence policies, uniformly applied by mortgagees prior to
purchase, would cripple the ability of fraudulent lenders to pawn
predatory loans off on others in the mortgage industry. If predatory loans
cannot be sold, they are unlikely to be made and all borrowers ... will be
protected. 304
For the reasons we have described, the time has come to adopt assignee
liability on a nationwide basis for securitized home loans.
percent of the resulting decline in North Carolina refinance loans after passage of that law
consisted of a reduction in loans with predatory features. See Quercia, Stegman & Davis,
supra note 273, at 593-97. A 2006 study by the Center for Responsible Lending echoed
their finding, reporting that the proportion of loans with specified predatory loan terms fell in
many states with anti-predatory lending laws, relative to states without those laws. See Li &
Ernst, supra note 92, at 11-12. As both studies illustrate, the critical question is not whether
lending fell in absolute terms, but what type of lending fell, bad or good.
303. See GAO, supra note 109, at 76-79.
304. See HUD, supra note 233.
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